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MORE ON ACT AND CRIME
MICHAEL S. MOOREjNot only were the editors of the Law Review kind enough to
organize and host the Act & Crime Symposium whose articles precede
this one, but they have also graciously allowed me a chance to
respond to some of the suggestions and criticisms made in those
articles. Since each article contains many points, I will not attempt
to respond to all of them. Nor shall I seek to respond to each
author separately. Rather, I have grouped my responses to all
authors around eight topics: (1) the relevance of metaphysics and
the philosophy of action to issues of legal and moral responsibility;
(2) stylistic and organizational issues as to how to draw certain
distinctions and how to have organized Act and Crime'; (3) the
proper way to conceive of omissions; (4) the moral and legal
relevance of omissions so conceived; (5) whether the concurrence
requirement-that act, mental state, and causation all concur for
prima facie liability-is always true of our ascriptions of moral and
legal responsibility; (6) the nature of the criminal law's voluntary act
requirement and its application to troublesome cases such as
sleepwalking and other dissociated states; (7) whether volitions are
a kind of intention and how they contrast with other candidates for
the immediate mental executors of those bodily movements that are
actions; and (8) whether actions and events are to be individuated
by the properties they exemplify or in the manner I propose in Act
and Crime. I welcome the opportunity to say more on these topics,
although I would venture that it is not so much more that it leads
to any wholesale surrender by those whose criticisms I seek to
deflect.

t Leon Meltzer Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania.
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I. THE RELEVANCE OF THE "HIGH METAPHYSICS" OF ACTION
TO ISSUES OF LEGAL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

In presentations of some of my more metaphysical papers over
the years I have noticed a marked reluctance of political and legal
philosophers to concede me a worthwhile topic. Indeed, even the
use of the word "metaphysics" often bothers my colleagues in legal/
political philosophy. My suspicion is that many philosophers who
specialize in legal or political philosophy choose to do so in part to
get away from the abstractness and seeming irrelevance of metaphysical questions like, "What is an action?" They also resist what
they see as the cabining effect of the "brute facts" of metaphysics
dictating answers to the design of legal and political institutions
when those answers seem better argued for on normative grounds.
Of the present commentators on Act and Crime, Bernard
Williams and, to a lesser extent, Samuel Freeman, Stephen Morse,
and Jennifer Hornsby seem to have experienced a bit of this
resistance to metaphysics. Williams, for example, urges that "the
criminal law, after all, has special aims and purposes" that should
guide "the requirements that it imposes on describing people's
actions," whereas the metaphysics of action is "motivated quite
independently of those special purposes."2 Similarly, Freeman
finds the principles and norms relevant to criminal law to "have
their bases not in metaphysical considerations, but in the practical
necessities and interests of democratic citizens." 3 Even were this
not true, Freeman adds, we should "avoid using the metaphysics of
action as much as possible" in criminal law because of the difficulties of obtaining agreement on the truth of any one version of such
4
metaphysics.
The structure of Act and Crime was designed to forestall such
worries. For each of its three parts, the book begins with criminal
law doctrine, probes that doctrine's moral point, and only then asks
metaphysical questions about actions. This structure was adopted
to justify a metaphysical analysis before any was done. Moreover,
if the purposes behind the doctrines in question did not require a
metaphysical answer, none was sought. For example, on the
individuation of "units of offense" required for double jeopardy,
2 Bernard Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr. Caligari,142 U. PA. L. REv. 1661, 1661
(1994).
Samuel Freeman, Criminal Liability and the Duty to Aid the Distressed, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 1455, 1456 (1994).
4 Id. at 1455.

1994)

MORE ON ACT AND CRIME

1751

one might think that the metaphysics of event-tokens and of acttokens should be used to give the legally appropriate answer. In
chapter 14 1 argue to the contrary, setting aside any metaphysics-ofaction answer to the unit of offense question in favor of a "wrongrelative" mode of individuation. I do this because the dominating
purpose animating the doublejeopardy requirement-to proportion
punishment to desert-requires a count of the separate instances of
wrongs done by an accused, not a count of the separate act-tokens
he may have done in doing those wrongs.
Williams and Freeman applaud my eschewal of the metaphysics
of action on such occasions.5 They worry, however, that much of
my book presupposes "a more robust view of the role of metaphysics" in criminal law theory.6 They are right to worry, since I do
have a more robust view. When the criminal law requires a
voluntary act, I take that doctrine to require the doing of an actionas that natural kind of event is theorized about in the metaphysics
of action. When the criminal law prohibits complex act types like
killings, maimings, burnings, frightenings, and the like, I take those
doctrines to require the causing of certain states of affairs (deaths,
disfigurements, and so forth)-as the metaphysics of causation would
analyze such causings. When the criminal law requires that a
prohibited action take place when the actor also has a culpable
mental state and where the state trying him has both jurisdiction to
legislate and to adjudicate, I take those doctrines to require the
finding of the temporal and spatial locations of actions-as the
metaphysics of action would analyze such locations.
Each of these criminal law doctrines invites my metaphysical
enquiries because of the moral points behind such doctrines. Such
purposes are themselves subservient to the overarching purpose of
criminal punishment, which is retributive: people should be
punished because of (and only in proportion to) their moral deserts.
This means that legal doctrines (such as that requiring a voluntary
act or that requiring punishable acts to be instances of wrongful acttypes, like killings) are best interpreted so as to get at the moral
deserts of offenders, and morality itself invites metaphysical answers
to questions like, "Is sleepwalking really an action?"
There are five sets of concerns that appear to motivate Williams,
Freeman, Morse, and Hornsby to their sharing of a less optimistic
5 See Williams, supra note 2, at 1662; Freeman, supra note 3, at 1455.
6 Freeman, supra note 3, at 1456.
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view about the role of the metaphysics of action in criminal law
theory (recognizing that not all of them share each of these
concerns). This first concern comes from Williams's uniformly
practical view of the law, morality, and the metaphysics of action.
Each of these areas of thought, Williams believes, is guided by its
own unique purposes and concerns. And why should we think that
a criminal law act requirement (guided, for example, by a concern
not to punish the undeterrable) should track an act condition we
might attach to our everyday ascriptions of moral responsibility
(which are themselves guided, say, by the purpose of directing an
appropriate response of shame)?
The probable difference in the purposes guiding the criminal
law and those guiding our ordinary responsibility ascriptions exists
for Williams only because of his own theories in political philosophy
and in metaethics. More specifically, Williams is not a retributivist
in his political philosophy about punishment. He thus thinks
reasons other than giving guilty offenders their just deserts justify
and guide criminal sanctions. It is this more heterogeneous theory
of punishment that allows him to think that the criminal law should
be guided by a set of purposes that are unique to it. Then one
might well think that such other purposes set aside the metaphysics
of action because they set aside the morality (of desert) that
requires such metaphysical analysis of action.
In addition, Williams is not a realist in his metaphysics of
morality. He does not, in other words, believe that moral qualities
like desert exist in the mind- and convention-independent way that
defines moral realism. Williams is thus free to think, as indeed he
does, that the ascriptions of moral responsibility by one person to
another are guided by "the aim of directing some response" to the
one about whom the ascription is made.' Moral responsibility
ascriptions, in other words, are judgments made to achieve some
purpose and not simply to describe the moral truth about someone.
Such purpose of guiding responses of various kinds need have no
correspondence with the purpose of getting the morality right, so
Williams may also put the metaphysics of action aside just because
he puts aside (as meaningless) any concern with the moral truths
that require such metaphysical enquiries.
I cannot hope to bridge these first kinds of differences with
Williams here, constituting as they do two large issues of political

Williams, supra note 2, at 1662.
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philosophy and metaethics. My only point here is to note that
insofar as Williams's suspicions about the metaphysics of action
stem from these sources, they presuppose a good deal against which
I have explicitly argued elsewhere, outside of Act and Crime.8 If one
adopts my own retributivist theory of punishment, then the guiding
purpose of criminal law is to punish those who deserve it in
proportion to their desert. If one adopts my own noninterest
relative metaethics, then the finding of moral desert is not a matter
of any purpose of ours, save the purpose of describing the moral
facts of responsibility accurately. And if one adopts the view of the
relevant moral facts about responsibility that I offer in chapter 3 of
Act and Crime, one will find questions like "What is an action?" to be
central in assessing moral desert.
A second set of concerns about the relevance of the metaphysics
of action to the criminal law is openly avowed by none of my
commentators. Yet I suspect it may be present (and if not, it is
certainly present in others). This concern stems from an antirealist
position about actions (and perhaps events more generally).9 A
good working hypothesis is that if you scratch a skeptic about the
utility of a metaphysical analysis you will find a skeptic about the
truth of that metaphysical analysis.
This is certainly true in
metaethics, where those who argue against the relevance of the
moral realist/antirealist debate are invariably skeptical antirealists
about morality. The same may be true here on the metaphysics of
action. Thus, Williams wishes to substitute "philosophical" for
"metaphysical" because I gather he is more comfortable discussing
"philosophical procedures" than he is discussing "metaphysical
truths.""0
Also, Williams at one incautious point misreads my
metaphysical analysis as if it were seeking a conceptual essence to
actions, not a real essence"-but then, if one is an antirealist about
actions, such conceptual (or nominal) essences, are all the essences
there are. Also, Williams seems to suggest that our ordinary
" See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP

233-43 (1984) [hereinafter MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY]; Michael S. Moore, The
Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Michael S. Moore,JustifyingRetributivism,27 ISR. L.

REV. 15 (1993); Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424
(1992); Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061.
I explore a variety of antirealisms about actions in Act and Crime. See MOORE,
supra note 1, at 60-77.
10See Williams, supra note 2, at 1661-62.
n See id. at 1669.
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ascriptions of action must be motivated by their own purposes
(which need not be the same as the purposes of the criminal law), 2
as if our ordinary ascriptions were not guided simply by a desire to
get to the (moral and/or explanatory) truth of the matter. Also,
Williams finds that "there is something odd about discussing such
cases [as somnambulism] and their relation to action in terms of
3
appearance and reality.""
Yet if one were a realist about human
actions constituting a natural kind, it would hardly be odd to think
that there could be the "fool's gold of actions" because the essence
of natural kinds is often found in deeper, less knowable natures and
not in easily known symptoms. Only someone who thinks that all
there is to human action is what we see-such as an intelligent
pattern of behavior in sleepwalking-should find this potential
divorce of appearance and reality "odd." Finally, and most tellingly,
Williams finds significance in the fact that "everyday users of action
descriptions" do not ask or answer certain questions about actions
that the criminal law must ask and answer. 4 More specifically,
Williams thinks that this fact of ordinary usage of action verbs shows
that "there is no reason to suppose that philosophical procedures
themselves [metaphysics of action?] can answer" such questions.15
Williams's view must be that the metaphysics of action runs out of
answers because the conventional discourse about actions has run
out of questions. Only an antirealist about actions could think this.
In chapter 4 of Act and Crime I deal with a variety of antirealisms
about human actions, or about events more generally. Since there
is no explicitly argued for antirealism amongst my commentators,
there is no new argument to address. To the extent that doubts
about the relevance of the metaphysics of action arise from this
quarter, some new argument would have to be found.
A third set of concerns more plainly motivates the reservations
about the role of metaphysics in criminal law theory of Morse,
Hornsby, and Williams. This is the concern that the metaphysics of
action, even conceding arguendo its relevance, yields no answers in
problematic or borderline cases. Williams conceives of the concept
of action as having an "indeterminacy through vagueness." 6 Such
degree-vagueness in the concept of action creates a continuum
2 See id. at 1661-62.
13Id.
14 Id.

at 1667.
at 1662.

15Id. at 1663.
16 id.
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between action and involuntary bodily movement, and on such a
smooth and slippery slope, Williams tells us, "[i]t must be a scholastic illusion to suppose that somewhere on those slopes ... real, fullblown action is suddenly to be found as opposed to mere bodily
movement. " 17 On this point Morse finds common cause with
Williams, for Morse concludes that the problem cases cannot be
"decided by a natural kind theory of action" and must instead be
reached by other, more practical considerations."
Hornsby too
suggests that "[p]erhaps it is not always determinate whether 'is an
action' applies," stating that she would therefore be happy to
concede a vagueness in her own definition of action (since it would
match the vagueness of the concept of action).' 9
Under a nonmetaphysical, epistemic interpretation of Morse,
Hornsby, and Williams, it would be easy to agree with them. The
epistemic interpretation is that we presently lack sufficient information to resolve questions like "Are somnambulistic behaviors really
actions?" I myself regard the question as rather underdetermined
by the presently available evidence.2" In default of such information, we may indeed do better to repair to Morse's more practical
concerns.
Yet I understand Morse, Hornsby, and Williams not to be
making an epistemic point. Rather, theirs seems to be the metaphysical point that there are no metaphysical answers "at the
border," not just that we at present lack sufficient information to
justify belief in one answer over another. Yet I am not sure that I
see the backing for their point when taken metaphysically. The
vagueness of the concept of action-or in our usage of the word,
"action"-is surely no argument that the metaphysics of action is
indeterminate in the penumbral range of application of action
terms. Vagueness and open texture are conventional features of
language use not reflective of what may or may not exist in the way
of a hidden nature of a natural kind.2 If I am right in Act and
Crime that human actions are a natural kind of event, then it takes
1

7 Id. at 1672.
"8StephenJ. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1587, 1651 (1994).
"9 Jennifer Hornsby, Action and Aberration, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1719, 1737 n.59

(1994).

o See MOORE, Supra note 1, at 259.

2 I have written elsewhere on vagueness as a conventional feature of language.

See Michael S. Moore, A NaturalLaw Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,

307-09 (1985).
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some argument besides vagueness to suggest that there is no
determinative answer in borderline cases.
So Morse, Williams, and Hornsby must be suggesting one of two
things. They either disagree with me about human actions being a
natural kind of event, or they must think that natural kinds may
have fuzzy borders, that the kind, human actions, is one such fuzzy
kind, and that somnambulism and hypnotic behaviors are in the
fuzzy border of the kind.
Perhaps surprising to my commentators, I think either of these
is genuinely possible. As I said in Act and Crime, "what is and is not
a natural kind is itself a matter of scientific discovery, not of
conceptual necessity."22 I also think it possible for natural kinds
to have fuzzy borders. If species, for example, are natural kinds-a
much disputed point-their gradual evolution from one to another
belies any bright line between them. The same could be true of the
kind, human action. But one would like to see the argument and
the evidence. Whether there is a metaphysical answer about
somnambulism and like cases is a question on which all the evidence
is not in. The only point of the section of Act and Crime dealing
with these problem cases2 3 was to indicate what one should look
for in the way of evidence in light of the volitional theory of action.
It might indeed turn out that the volitional theory is falsified or
that, under that theory, the evidence is indeterminate as to whether
volitions cause the pertinent behavior sequences in the way that
would make them actions.
My disagreement with Morse, Hornsby, and Williams here is
apparently a disagreement about the state of our evidence. They
seem sure that there are no metaphysical answers about somnambulism and like cases whereas I think the evidence does not (yet)
warrant that conclusion.
Williams's label for my view, "new
scholasticism,"24 seems an odd one for what I would think of as a
cautious empiricism.
A fourth set of concerns about the relevance of the metaphysics
of action to criminal law theory is shared by at least Hornsby and
Williams. They both think that moral responsibility is such that
action does not play the decisive role I assign to it. Thus, even if the
purposes of the criminal law mandated an exclusive focus on moral
desert, and even if the metaphysics of action were such that it could

' MOORE, supra note 1, at 76.
23See id. at 257.
24 See Williams, supra note 2, at 1669, 1672.
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generate determinate answers about what is and is not an action,
moral desert itself is such that the metaphysical answers are idle.
Hornsby puts this cautiously as a question,2 5 whereas Williams
is more insistent. In his tale of the evil Caligari controlling the
somnambulistic Cesare, what Williams "want[s] to insist is that the
conclusions about responsibility should not be based on supposing
that the reason why Caligari, and not Cesare, is the murderer is
simply that the killing of the town clerk was Caligari's action and
not Cesare's."26 I want to insist just the opposite, so I guess issue
is joined here.
Williams is surely correct to assume that the somnambulistic
Cesare is not morally responsible for the death of the town clerk
caused by Cesare's sleep stabbing. The question is why Cesare is
not responsible. I think it is because he did not perform the action
of killing the town clerk because he did not act at that time at all.
Williams thinks that it is because Caligari controlled Cesare's
objectives.27 Williams's alternative explanation seems problematic.
Having one's objectives controlled by another does not generally
defeat responsibility. As I explore in Act and Crime, when Patty
Hearst had her objectives controlled by the Simbionese Liberation
28
Army, that did not relieve her of responsibility for bank robbery.
What is relevant to her responsibility is whether she executed her
newly implanted objectives, that is, whether she acted. The same is
true of Cesare.
Williams himself seems to appreciate the nature of this execution perfectly well. He points out that the somnambulistic Cesare
is so dissociated "from considerations that essentially bear" on what
he is doing that he "cannot summon up... thoughts that would
relate the killing to the rest of his life." 29 This lack of integration
of Cesare's implanted objective (to kill the town clerk) with many of
his other objectives helps to explain why Cesare is not responsible
for the death." It even explains why Cesare could not have done
any acts of agreeing to kill." But for Williams, none of this lends
support to the idea that Cesare does not perform the action of
"sSee Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1740.
26

Williams, supra note 2, at 1670-71.

27 See id.
28 See MooRE,

supra note 1, at 259-60.

' Williams, supra note 2, at 1671.

so See id.
s1 See id.
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killing the town clerk.3 2 Yet Williams has actually described why
it is that Cesare did not perform the action of killing the town clerk.
Integration of conflicting objectives is one of the defining functions
of volitions, ss so that when that function is absent volition (and
thus, action) is absent. The asleep Cesare did no actions of stabbing
or killing. In fact, he slept through the whole thing.
The fifth and last set of concerns about reliance upon metaphysics in the criminal law is most directly voiced by Freeman.
Freeman's generally Rawlsian outlook inclines him to favor those
legal principles that can be publicly understood and agreed upon by
citizens in a democracy.3 4 Insofar as criminal law principles take
their content from the "high metaphysics" of action, they will not be
either understood or agreed on. Freeman therefore takes this to be
a reason not to have criminal law doctrines and principles depend
on such a metaphysics unless absolutely necessary "as a last
35
resort."
It is surely a desideratum of our criminal laws that they be
knowable by those who must obey them, and this does require that
such laws be understandable to that large majority of citizens not
holding philosophy degrees in the metaphysics of action. Yet
nothing in my view of the role of metaphysics in criminal law runs
contrary to this ideal of legality. The difference between action and
bodily movement, for example, is widely experienced and appreciated. Although metaphysicians may talk about it in unfamiliar ways,
the difference they are talking about is not unfamiliar, even to the
most unreflective among us.
Freeman of course worries that legal policymakers need greater
understanding than the intuitive appreciation satisfactory for
citizens. Such policymakers need to know, for example, whether
Alvin Goldman's single-instance trope metaphysics of actions is both
correct and relevant to the tests for double jeopardy, or whether my
"wrong-relative" approach and "coarse-grained" metaphysics is what
is needed." Freeman probably thinks that if Goldman and I show
up in the Arizona or Pennsylvania legislatures with our different
32 See

id.
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 137-55, 258.
' See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1455-56.
35Id.
33

36 Compare MOORE, supra note 1, at 305-90 with Alvin I. Goldman, Action and
Crime: A Fine-GrainedApproach, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1584-86 (1994).
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approaches to double jeopardy, we would be in some jeopardy of
confinement ourselves.
Although the picture admittedly is amusing to contemplate, we
should not allow difficulties in immediate translatability to be any
more than practical limitations on where and when one argues
metaphysics. We should not elevate them into principled limits on
what is worth arguing about in the context of drafting a criminal
code. We should rather agree with Jeremy Bentham on this, who
saw such enquiries, abstract as they are, as the indispensable first
steps to a rational criminal law."7
II. THE PRESENTATIONAL STRATEGY OF ACT AND CRIME:
HORNSBY'S "CONFUSIONS"

I am
Jennifer Hornsby thinks that I am very confused."
I
think
this.
she
should
thing
at
least-why
about
one
confused
should have thought her to have been too sophisticated a reader to
have so misinterpreted what I wrote in Act and Crime. Often the
alleged "confusions" she finds in my book are due solely to a lack
of context-sensitivity on her part. At these times Hornsby is like the
reader who would criticize a metaphorical statement such as, "man
is a wolf," because she takes such statements to be attempted
contributions to zoological theory and then, having so misconstrued
them, gleefully pronounces them to be false. At other times
Hornsby creates a "confusion" for me because she has her own
stipulated meanings for certain words and phrases, and when my
usage does not conform to her own idiosyncratic stipulations she
reads me as if it did. Infusing her meanings into my usage when it
is plainly not what I meant certainly creates confusion but it equally
certainly does not discover antecedently existing confusions.
Finally, I do think that there is some genuine misunderstanding of
what I meant by Hornsby because she failed to understand the
organizational and presentational strategy of Act and Crime. One
should judge that part of her criticism generated from this source
as a criticism of style and of presentational strategy, which is all it
39
amounts to.
37 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND

LEGISLATION 72 n.1 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1988). It is instructive that

Bentham's favorite quotation from Helvitius was, "Ifphilosophers would be of use to
the world, let them survey it from the point of view of the legislator." GERALD
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986).
's See Hornsby, supra note 19 passim.
s Sometimes Hornsby's criticisms are explicitly organizational and stylistic, as
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Given her background in philosophy, I wish Hornsby had rather
focused on the one substantive issue in action theory on which I
know we disagree. Not only would this have saved her from
torturing what I said so as to create nonexistent "confusions,"
"contradictions," "conflations," and "absurdities," but she might
have actually advanced our understanding of this issue.
Hornsby thinks I am guilty of two big confusions and many little
mistakes.40 The two big confusions are: (1) I confuse the things

when she finds "not very inviting" my ordering of my identity and exclusivity theses
(in chapters 5 and 11, respectively), see id. at 1727; when she opines that I "take[]
matters backwards" in chapter 6 when I clarify what volitions might be before I argue
for the existence of volitions, id. at 1730; or when she sniffs an "inconsistency" in my
treatment of acts being identical to bodily movements--an inconsistency shown only
"in due course" by me to be "apparent only," id. at 1729. More often Hornsby's
criticisms pretend to be substantive when in reality they amount to no more than
either a misunderstanding of, or a disagreement with, the organization and
presentational strategy of the book.
0 Aside from her organizational quibbles discussed supra note 39, Hornsby's other
quibbles include:
(1) Her dislike of my coinage of "complex" (rather than "nonbasic") to
refer to act-token descriptions like "killing," id. at 1721 n.8;
(2) Her finding of my phrase, "partial identity," to be an "extraordinary"
and "strange" terminology and an "exaggeration" even though it is
clear to Hornsby exactly what the phrase denotes, id. at 1729, 1742;
(3) Her dislike of my occasionally elliptical references to the causal
sequence, volition-cause-bodily movement,, by a term literally denoting
only one of the parts of this sequence, id. at 1730 n.36;
(4) Her dislike of the label, "mental action theorist," as applied by me to
refer to her theory as well as to other similar theories of action, a label
Hornsby thinks is "bound to mislead," id. at 1744; and
(5) Her finding it "remarkable" to think of volitions as bare intentions
"because Hart coined 'bare intention' for the case of someone who
intends to do something without doing (or having yet done) anything
to execute her intention," id. at 1733 n.44.
Very quickly, in reply:
(1) Other philosophers of action, for example, Antony Duff and Alvin
Goldman, find my coinage of "complex" useful because it does not
reject a scalar approach, as Hornsby suggests; nor does my usage imply
that the consequences of act-tokens are parts of act-tokens, even while
it would (rightly) allow that act-types such as killings may have certain
event-types like deaths as parts. See R.A. Duff, Acting Trying, and
CriminalLiability, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 75, 77, 80
(Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); Goldman, supra note 36, at 1581.
(2) Apparently Hornsby did not read far enough to find my unpacking of
"partial identity" at pages 330 through 332 of Act and Crime. In any
case, the notion is both clear in my usage and philosophically wellestablished. See, e.g., DAVID M. ARMSTRONG, A THEORY OF UNIVERSALS
37-38, 120-24 (1978).
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we do, which are abstract universals, with actions, which are
particular events; and (2) I confuse what it is that can be basic or
complex, sometimes applying the opposition to actions and
sometimes applying it to descriptions or types of actions. I shall
consider each in turn.
A. Types and Tokens, Things Done and Actions
To accuse me of the first of these confusions is preposterous.
Early on in Act and Crime I introduce the distinction between tokens
of actions and events, which are particulars, and types of actions
and events, which are abstract universals.41 I then employ the
distinction to show how certain arguments in the philosophy of
42
action have sometimes neglected this crucial distinction.
Hornsby prefers her own distinctive terminology for the
distinction-a terminology that is neither idiomatic in ordinary
(3) In context the ellipses are rarely confusing. On elliptical references to
practical syllogisms, see infra text accompanying notes 312-13.
(4) "Mental action theorist" is standard brand labeling for Hornsby and her
ilk. See e.g., MYLES BRAND, INTENDING AND ACTING 8-9 (1984) ("Aune
... , Davis ... , and Hornsby ... advocate versions of the Mental
Action Theory."); CARL GINET, ON ACTION 15 n.13 (1990) ("Others
who have recognized the primacy of mental action in characterizing
action in general include... Hornsby.... And on their accounts of
action in general, these mental actions are not only primary, but all the
actions there are . ..

.").

Hornsby's complaint, therefore, is not with

me.
(5) My usage of Herbert Hart's coinage, "bare intention," is neither new
nor remarkable. See H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment,in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrTY 117 (1968). Hart used the phrase to denote
what Elizabeth Anscombe had earlier termed, "intention for the
future." G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 1-9 (2d ed. 1963). Such
intentions were "bare" or "future" for Hart and Anscombe because, in
the usages of the word "intention" they were isolating, no past action
was being explained by such intentions, only future actions planned.
But such usage facts about "intention" can hardly preclude one from
theorizing, as I do, that the intentions that do explain actions (as
executors of belief/desire sets) are just the sort of mental states
misleadingly referred to by Hart and Anscombe as "bare" or "future'
intentions. I suppose Hornsby also finds Michael Bratman's label for
these intentions ("future-directed intentions") to be "remarkable," since
he engages in precisely the same theoretical move, albeit appropriating
Anscombe's old label rather than Hart's. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN,
INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 4-5 (1987); Michael E.

Bratman, Moore on Intention and Volition, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1705, 1706
(1994).
4' See MOORE, supra note 1, at 80-81.
42 See

id. at 90-91.
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English nor standard in the philosophy of action-and then finds
"confusions" when I do not follow her peculiar terminological
stipulations. For Hornsby, "action" should always be taken to refer
to a particular action someone does on a particular occasion, what
I and almost all philosophers of action call "act-tokens." Additionally, according to Hornsby, "things we do" should always be taken to
refer to types of action, what I and almost all philosophers of action
call "act-types." Hornsby recognizes that the first of her stipulations
does not at all correspond to ordinary usage, because our usage of
"a killing," "a maiming," or "an action" can as easily refer to an acttype as an act-token. She claims conformity to ordinary English for
her second stipulation, however: things we do locutions, like "what
she did was to raise her arm," never refer to act-tokens in ordinary
usage.45
This last claim about idiomatic English is surely false. As just
one example, consider this bit of unself-conscious prose from
Bernard Williams's contribution to the Symposium: "[W]hat Cesare
does is a cause of death, but so is what Caligari does-which we are
to assume consists in saying something to Cesare." 44 On one
popular common sense view of causation, causal relations exist
between event-tokens and it is only causal generalizations whose
terms refer to act-types. Yet Hornsby would deny that Williams
could have meant to refer to event-tokens. Unfortunately for
Hornsby's denial, ordinary usage simply does not support such a
regimentation of Williams's English. He easily could have meant by
what "Cesare does" to refer to an act-token that caused the death of
the victim, another event-token. The thing Cesare did was the acttoken, because (on the common sense view of singular causal
relations) only the act-token caused the particular event that was the
victim's death.
Hornsby notes that I am "not alone in making the confusion,"
citing Donald Davidson as an example of how "nearly everyone who
writes in the area sometimes talks in ways that partake of the
4S See Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1722 n.II (stating that "'raising my arm' never
applies to a particular in fact").
44Williams, supra note 2, at 1672. Or consider this bit of prose from Michael
Corrado's contribution to the Symposium: "Basic acts are... the only things that we
do, because an act, properly so called, does not include the circumstances, conditions,
or consequences of the bodily movement involved in the act." Michael Corrado, Is
There an Act Requirement in the CriminalLaw?, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1529, 1530 (1994).
By "things we do" Corrado should be taken to be referring to act-tokens, not acttypes; otherwise, his claim here would be absurd.
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confusion."4 5 Yet if I, Williams, Davidson, and everyone else
besides Hornsby do not mark the distinction as she marks it,
perhaps the correct inference to have drawn was that hers is not an
intuitive or idiomatic way in which to mark the distinction.
Despite the artificiality of her two stipulative meanings of
"action" and "things one did," Hornsby nonetheless imposes her
meanings on my usages of these words and phrases to yield
propositions I would not subscribe to for a minute. Small wonder
that Hornsby finds "hundreds" of examples of "confusing usage."46
This also allows Hornsby to convict me of two "absurd" claims that
she has to know I do not make.
In chapter 11 of Act and Crime I defend the coarse-grained view
of act-token individuation according to which when I kill Jones by
firing a bullet, and I fire a bullet by depressing a trigger, and I
depress a trigger by moving my finger, I do but one action, not
four. In introducing this familiar identity claim about actions, I
made clear that the identity claimed was between act-tokens but not
act-types:
[T]he only acts there are bodily movements ....
... [T]he identity here spoken of is an identity of act-tokens
and not act-types. The exclusivity thesis cannot claim that killings
as a type of action are identical to some discrete set of basic
acts ....

Rather, the claim is only that for each act of killing,

there is a corresponding basic act of limb movement, and these
two nominally distinct acts are in reality one and the same
event.

47

Reading any usage of me of things we do (like killings) to refer to
types, Hornsby has me claiming a type-identity here: "A proponent
of the so-called coarse-grained view does not advance Moore's
absurd claim-that various different things done by a person are
identical . ... "4
The type identity claim of course would be an
absurd claim, but no fair reader of Act and Crime could interpret the
book to advance it.
The second example is Hornsby's reading of my "identity thesis"
proper, viz., the thesis that each act of bodily movement T is identical
to the causal sequence, volition-cause-bodily movement,. Again I

'Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1724 n.18.
4
1Id. at 1722 n.11.
47 MOORE, supra note 1, at 110.
48Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1724.
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explicitly deny that this is a thesis identifying types of events.4 9
This time Hornsby grudgingly allows that "Moore temporarily avoids
50
the confusion.., where he is accusing his opponents of it."
Nonetheless, my type/token confusion is still "very evident" to
Hornsby, even here.5 When I say that "[t]he identity of act-tokens
with movement-tokens is in no way affected by ... [an] argument
against type-identities,"52 Hornsby insists that the "act-types"
(whose identity with bodily movements I deny) are for me particulars, namely, act-tokens. 3
Hornsby thus has me saying that
arguments against token identities in no way affect token identitiesl
Hornsby fervently wishes to regiment philosophical usage in a
particular way. For my own part I think such regimentation is
unnecessary. Ambiguous words and phases such as "action," "act,"
and "things we do" only need systematic, stipulative disambiguation
if the context of their usage on particular occasions does not make
clear which sense is meant.5 4 Consider the reference of the phrase
"Hornsby's confusions" as it appears in the title of this Section. The
phrase as used is triply ambiguous, between: (1) referring to the
alleged "confusions" Hornsby attributes to me; (2) referring to the
confusions Hornsby suffers under when she attributes "confusions"
to me; (3) referring to the "confusions" Hornsby pretends to be
suffering under when she attributes "confusions" to me. Only
someone utterly lacking in subtlety (or humor) would demand a
stipulative disambiguation of what is meant, whereas I prefer leaving
it to the context of utterance to disambiguate the phrase.
In any case, even if Hornsby's regimentation were a good idea,
it is a ludicrous way to sell her proposal to me and other philosophers to treat a book that has not adopted it (in its usages of
"actions" and "things we do") as if it had. Doing such an odd thing
will guarantee that "contradictions flow" like water. Such a river of
contradictions flows, of course, only if one is intent on misreading
whether type or token is meant by an author and only if one uses
49 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 81.
" Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1725 n.19.
51 Id.
12 MOORE,

supra note 1, at 91.

Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1725 n.19 ("[T]he 'act-types' Moore speaks of here
are the very things that... Moore has very recently insisted are particulars (or 'acttokens')").
' See Michael S. Moore, The Semantics ofjudging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 183-87
53

(1981) (discussing the role of linguistic and nonlinguistic context in disambiguating

otherwise ambiguous expressions).
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one's own artificial, stipulative vocabulary as the means to carry out
that intent.
B. Basic/Complex Descriptionsof Act-Tokens
My second "confusion" is with respect to the sorts of things that
may be "basic" or "complex." The possibilities are three: (1) that
act-tokens are basic or complex; (2) that act-types are basic or
complex; or (3) that descriptions of act-tokens are basic or complex.
Hornsby and I both think that the third is the right answer. What
is basic or complex is a description of a particular event, namely, an
act-token. This is the standard view in the philosophy of action,
although it is often put in the idiom of an "action under a descrip55
tion" being basic or complex.
I make this very plain in the footnote to which Hornsby alludes.
I thus say that we shall provisionally think of "basic/complex" as
applying to act-tokens, but that later we shall not do so: "The
basic/complex distinction then becomes a distinction between two
sort of description of acts, not between two sorts of action.... On
this, see Jennifer Hornsby, Actions. For now, I adopt the more
idiomatic terminology of basic versus complex actions."56
I should have thought the reference to chapter and verse of
Hornsby's own adoption of the standard view would have forestalled
Hornsby's misinterpretations. Determined to stick me with absurd
and contradictory views, however, Hornsby first misinterprets and
then brushes aside my footnote. She misinterprets the footnote by
reading my phrase, "two sorts of description of acts," as referring to
descriptions in the abstract, not as used on a particular occasion to
refer to an act-token. As Hornsby puts it, "one has to have
particulars [act-tokens] and things done [descriptions] simultaneously on the scene if one is to understand basicness."5 7 That is of
course exactly what I think, thought, and said. Hornsby, however,
wants to read my footnote as attaching the basic/complex distinction "to descriptions in isolation"5 8 of any particular act-token.
Descriptions of action not used on a particular occasion to refer to
an act-token-that is, descriptions "in isolation"-for Hornsby
"correspond with" act-types.5 9 So Hornsby wants to read me as

" For

example, as in DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTs 61

(1980).

MOORE, supra note 1, at 79 n.5 (citation omitted).
5 Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1723 n.15.
-

55
Id.
9

Id. at 1721 n.10 ("Things we do correspond one to one with descriptions of
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attaching the basic/complex distinction to act-types-this despite my
explicit statement that "[t]here is no type of act that is basic; only
particular acts."6" Of course, since Hornsby generally is bound and
determined to construe my reference to act-tokens to be "confused"
references to act-types, riding roughshod on what I said here should
present no particular problems for her.
Mostly, however, Hornsby wants to brush aside my footnote so
as to attribute to me the view that basic/complex is a distinction
applicable to act-tokens. For if she can stick me with this as my
ultimate view, then "contradictions flow," as she happily reports.
For example, "Assuming, as Moore does, that what is basic is not
complex, it is very obvious that no complex action is the same as
any basic one."61 Yet in chapter 11 Moore identifies every complex
act-token with some basic act-token. Ergo, the guy must be a
moron.
Hornsby completely missed my presentational strategy in writing
Act and Crime. I could have chosen to write the book in a way that
would have prevented Hornsby's supposed "confusions": I could
have begun my analysis with my conclusion about what actions are
and written the book entirely from that point of view. To be clear,
it is worth seeing how such a book would have gone.
There is one metaphysical question asked about actions that
dominates Act and Crime, and that is the question of what actions
are. There are a limited number of well-charted answers to this
question: (1) all events, including actions, are proposition-like
entities or facts; (2) all events, including actions, are particulars that
may possess many properties; or (3) all events, including actions, are
neither propositions, nor particulars, nor properties or other
universals, but are tropes (abstract particulars, or concrete universals)." The Davidsonian tradition in the contemporary philosophy
of action, which Hornsby and I share, plumps for (2) as the correct
ontology for events generally and human actions specifically.6"
Within that tradition, there are significant differences about what
sort of events human actions are: (a) There is Hornsby's view,

actions (at least if it is allowed that acts can be typed as finely as descriptions of acts
can be distinguished")). My disagreement with Hornsby's apparent predicate
nominalism (as David Armstrong calls such a view in his A Theory of Universals) is not
important here. But see MOORE, supra note 1, at 333-34.
60 MOORE, supra note 1, at
61 Hornsby, supra note 19,

81.
at 1719.

62

See MOORE, supra note 1, at 65-67.

63

See generally DAVIDSON, supra note 55.
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standardly called the "mental action" view," which regards some
mental event or act (trying, willing, choosing, volition, etc.) as the
event we refer to as an action; (b) There is Donald Davidson's view,
which regards human bodily motion as the event we refer to as an
action;65 (c) There is my view, which regards both volitions and
bodily motions as parts of the complex event we refer to as an
action;66 (d) There is the componential view of Judy Thomson and
the late Irving Thalberg, which regards consequences of our willed
67
bodily motions (such as deaths) also to be parts of actions.
Notice that proceeding in this way need make no use of a
complex/basic distinction. To defend my view, (2)(c) above, only
requires that we talk about actions, not about basic or complex
ones. Why, then, did I not proceed in this straightforward way,
eliminating a distinction that is not needed and that seems to have
"confused" Hornsby? One of the aims of Act and Crime is to
resuscitate what Herbert Hart called the orthodox criminal law
theory of the act requirement. 68
Such resuscitation requires
fidelity to two bits of the history of criminal law theory: first, to the
way in which Austin/Bentham/Mill/Holmes propounded this
theory in the nineteenth century, and second, to the criticisms of
that theory made by Hart and his followers in this century. Such
fidelity to history in turn requires that one take seriously what it was
about the orthodox view-as it was propounded by those holding itthat lead Hart et al. to reject it.
Hart distinguished two troublesome aspects of the orthodox
view, its positing of volitions and its attempt to limit actions
"properly so called" to bodily movements.6 9 I thus split into two
separate theses, the "identity thesis" and the "mental cause thesis,"
what (on my ultimate view) is but one thesis, namely, that actions
are volitions-cause-bodily movement, ("VCM"). Since the objections
to ontology (2)(c) above further subdivide between those thinking
that no actions are VCM's and those thinking that some but not all
actions are VCM's, 70 I further split off an "exclusivity thesis" from
64 See generallyJENNIFER HORNSBY, ACTIONS (1980).
65 See DAVIDSON, supra note 55, at 61.
6 See generally MOORE, supra note 1.
67See generally IRVING THALBERG, PERCEPTION, EMOTION, AND ACTION:

A

COMPONENT APPROACH (1977);JUDrrHJ. THOMSON, ACTS AND OTHER EVENTS (1977);
Judith J. Thomson, The Time of a Killing, 68J. PHIL. 115 (1971).
68
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 44.
69
H.L.A. HART, Acts of Will andResponsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 40, at 97.
7oSee id. at 100-01; see also ERIC D'ARCY, HUMAN ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THEIR
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the identity thesis. This separation then required the defense of
two seemingly separate identity theses: (1) the thesis defended in
chapter 5 as the identity thesis proper (every act-token that those
separating these theses would take to be "basic," such the moving
of my finger as I write this, is identical to some VCM); and (2) the
thesis defended in chapter 11 as the exclusivity thesis (every acttoken that those separating these theses would take to be "complex," such as killings always are, is in reality only some act of
moving one's body). In reality there is only one identity claim here,
that every act-token is a VCM, but for purposes of separating this
thesis into two subtheses I introduce the basic/complex distinction.
Act and Crime is clear that these three separated theses are introduced in order to respond to the state of the debate in criminal law
theory. From the point of view of the final theory of action
developed by the end of the book-ontological view (2)(c)-the
distinctions employed are rather artificial. Thus, in introducing the
separation of the identity thesis from the exclusivity thesis, I say:
"Although ultimately to defend one of these theses will be to defend
the other, for ease of exposition it is helpful to examine them one
at a time."7 1 And with regard to the separation of the mental
cause thesis from the identity thesis: "Seeing the partial identity
asserted to exist by the identity thesis alone reveals the rather
72
artificial division between this thesis and the mental-cause thesis."
I said this because there is only one thesis, ultimately, that I am
defending here, which is (again) the thesis that every act-token is a
VCM, nothing less (mental action theorists), nothing more (componential theorists), and nothing else (everybody else).
What Hornsby fails to see is that my use of the complex/basic
distinction is part of my attempt to defend my view on the metaphysics of action in a way that fits the history just recited. I thus at
times pretend that the distinction is between act-tokens because that
is how it would be regarded by those defenders and critics of the
orthodox criminal law theory of action who separately defend or
attack one of the three (identity, exclusivity, mental cause) theses.
Thirty years of the philosophy of action that followed Arthur Danto
showed us why the distinction cannot ultimately be maintained in
that way, but to speak to the concerns that caused critics and

MORAL EVALUATION 9 (1963); J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBiLrry 6, 7 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961)
71MOORE, supra note 1, at 78.

72 Id. at 85.

1994]

MORE ON ACT AND CRIME

1769

defenders of the orthodox criminal law theory to divide their73 theory
into these theses requires one to suspend what one knows.
When I am speaking for myself in Act and Crime, and not within
the mindset of the orthodox criminal law theorists and their critics,
I use what Hornsby and I know: that the complex/basic distinction
is a distinction between different descriptions used on some
occasion to refer to one and the same act-token. For my own,
developed view, there are only two places that I need a complex/
basic distinction. One is to make clear the difference between the
actus reus and the voluntary act requirements of the criminal law.
Here I say that the voluntary act requirement is satisfied when a
particular event-token has the properties required by a basic act
description of that act-token, whereas the actus reus requirement is
satisfied only if in addition the event-token has the properties
required by some complex description
contained in some statute in
74
force at the time the act was done.
My second need of the complex/basic distinction is in my asking
what it is that complex descriptions of action might have in
common. 5 Recognizing that they will all presuppose the accuracy
of some basic description, what else might these nonbasic, or
complex, descriptions have in common in their ascribing of
properties to some act-token?
In both of these contexts I do not know how I could have been
clearer that I had dropped the pretense that the basic/complex
distinction has to do with act-tokens rather than with descriptions
of act-tokens:
Because the truth conditions of expressions using descriptions
such as 'killing,' 'saying,' 'concealing,' and 'raping' include the
existence of such extra properties, we are entitled to think of such
descriptions as complex. A basic description, by contrast, ascribes
only the property of bodily-movement-caused-by-a-volition,
which
75
is essential to the act being an act of any kind at all.

Hornsby despairs of finding any place in Act and Crime where I
shift from act-tokens to descriptions of act-tokens as the proper
locus for the basic/complex distinction: "[If it [the distinction]
really were to undergo a change, we should expect to be aware of

'

See id. at 79 n.6.

74 See id. at 170.
'

76

See id. at 189-237 (discussing unity in complex descriptions of act-tokens).
Id. at 169.
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it when it happens; yet we read in vain to discover the transmutation. " 77 Yet I do not think that I could have marked it any more
clearly that in the beginning of Part II of Act and Crime just quoted.
Hornsby, however, cites part of the last quoted passage from Act
and Crime and refuses to credit what it plainly says. 7' This, because
in chapter 11 I go back to a usage treating complex/basic as a
distinction between act-tokens-which I do, but again, only to pick
up some unfinished business from chapter 5 of Part I. The unfinished business is the defense of the exclusivity thesis in terms that
would make sense to those who have defended or attacked it
separately from their defense or attack of the identity and mental
cause theses.
Hornsby's basic mistake here lies in her not distinguishing my
own use of the distinction from my use of it as a heuristic device to
get at the orthodox theory and its critics. That is why Hornsby
looks in vain for one point in Act and Crime where a shift in
distinctions takes place and then does not revert.79 That is why
Hornsby thinks that I oscillate uncontrollably between "a distinction..., attaching to particulars in isolation, then to descriptions in
isolation." ° That is also why Hornsby attributes yet another
contradiction to me:
[T]he announced change in the distinction is not all that is needed
to remove Moore's inconsistencies. However the term "basic"
works, it cannot straightforwardly apply to any item that "complex" also applies to, given that no basic item is a complex one; it
makes no difference to this point what sort of items are meant to
8
be basic. '
If Hornsby saw that in the mindset of those critics of the orthodox
theory (who separately reject the mental cause, identity, and
exclusivity theses), complex/basic is a distinction applied to acttokens, she would see that we coarse-grained theorists would say (in
this usage of complex/basic) that what is basic is also complex, and
vice versa. If Hornsby saw that from the vantage point of our

77 Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1720.
71 See

id. at 1720 n.7.

7' See id. at 1720.

MId. at 1723 n.15.
81 Id. at 1720.
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own completed (coarse-grained) theory of action, complex/basic
applies to descriptions as used to refer to some act-token, she would
see, indeed, that "nothing basic is also complex." And if Hornsby
saw these two different usages of the complex/basic distinction, and
that only one is my own, the other being a heuristic to understand
others' views, she would have seen that there is no contradiction
here.

C. Two "Confusions" or One Evasion?
Hornsby's preoccupation with my two "confusions" unfortunately deflected her from replying to the detailed criticism in Act and
Crime of her arguments in her own book, Actions, for a "mental
action" theory.8 2 She accurately gauges that my challenge to her
was put in terms of "basicness":
We must deny... that there is any "good sense" to be made "of
talking about an action as a person's contractingT his muscles." In
the ordinary case, where a person has not undergone special
training, he does no contractingT of his muscles as an action of his;
rather he movesr his arm, and there is no simpler or more basic
action by which he performs such movementT.
Whether this is so is thus the crux of the matter ....

None

83
of Hornsby's three arguments even touch this crucial issue.

Hornsby's response? "It is to be expected that my arguments would
not touch this, because I do not think it makes sense: actions are
not related by 'more basic .... s4
Yet from the point of view of someone who has not yet been
convinced of the coarse-grained view of the act-token individuation
that I argue for in chapter 11 and who thus still takes basicness to
be about act-tokens, my way of putting the issue makes perfect
sense. And to someone like Hornsby, or me ultimately, who refuses
basicness as an attribute of act-tokens, it is easy to reformulate the
issue: Are contractings, and movements, parts of actions (as I
contend), or are they the effects of actions (as Hornsby contends)?
Hornsby herself reveals that she sees this as the crucial issue, since
she recognizes that in the book of hers that I was criticizing, Actions,
she was giving "arguments... for thinking that bodily movements,
s For my criticisms of Hornsby's arguments in her book Actions, see MOORE, supra
note 1, at 97-102.
8Id.

at 102.

' Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1745.
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are not parts of actions." 5 Since Hornsby has not supplemented
those arguments in any way, her current machinations about
confusions give me no reason to alter my original conclusion:
86
"None of Hornsby's ... arguments even touch this crucial issue."
One final word, one that calls it as I see it: Hornsby's "confusions" are the product of a desire to keep the philosophy of action
for those philosophers who specialize in it. "A little knowledge is
a dangerous thing" is the tone set by this kind of turf protection.
What Hornsby fails to see is that if we applied this protectionist
attitude to her own (actually quite welcome) venturings into the
criminal law, we would pronounce her to have butchered well-worn
87
distinctions like that between special and general mens rea,
interpret her in light of the standard meaning for the distinction,
and then "discover" hundreds of confusions, contradictions,
conflations, and absurdities in the claims manufactured by the
infusion of our meaning into her statements. That being a shabby
business, I refrain.
III. OMISSIONS:

CONCEPTUAL AND METAPHYSICAL ISSUES

We may now leave behind general worries, either about my
metaphysical program for the criminal law or about my heuristic
strategy for presenting it, and get to more particular objections.
Legal liability for omissions does not fit comfortably with the theory
of action developed in Act and Crime. Predictably, a number of the
commentators zeroed in on this fact in order to raise a number of
problems for me. To keep some semblance of order here, it will be
convenient to divide the problems into two groups. In this Section
I shall deal with conceptual and metaphysical worries about
omissions, raising questions of what omissions are or how they may
be conceptualized most fruitfully. In the following Section I shall
deal with moral and legal worries about what our responsibilities
might be for omissions.

" Id. at 1746 n.86.
supra note 1, at 102.

'6 MOORE,

Compare Hornsby's usage of the distinction between general/specific mens rea
in Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1727-28, 1737, 1739, with the standard distinction
invoked by these words in criminal law theory. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Declineof
Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273,273-75 (1968) (distinguishing special mens rea from
two senses of general mens rea).

1994]

MORE ON ACT AND CRIME

1773

A. Omissions as IntentionalAgency
A number of the commentators are tempted to conceive of
omissions more narrowly than I do. I introduced my generic notion
of an omission early in Act and Crime:
[O]missions are simply absent actions. An omission to save life is
not some kind of ghostly act of saving life, and certainly not some
ghostly kind of killing. It is literally nothing at all. An omission
to save X at some time t is just the absence of any instantiation of
the type of action, 'saving X.'88
This I recognized to be a broad conceptualization of omissions.
Fletcher8 9 and Hornsby"0 wish to narrow it to willed (intended,
chosen, etc.) refrainings, and perhaps, to willed refrainings when
the actor could have prevented the harm and she knew that. That
is, they wish to conceptualize, for example, an omission by Y to save
X at t as the choosing of the nonsaving of X by Y at t where Y could
have saved X at t and Y knew that.
There are three principal reasons offered for this narrower
conceptualization of omissions. One is the unity possible within a
theory of action if omissions too are conceived of in terms of
willing. Then all acts, be they acts of commission or of omission,
consist in an agent trying, choosing, intending, or willing that some
state of affairs come into being or remain the same. Such a unified
theory of action is of course the mental action theory favored by
Prichard,9 Davis,92 Hornsby,9" and others. 94
The second reason offered for the narrower conceptualization
of omissions is the apparent absurdity of my broader conceptualization. To quote Fletcher: "Dead men who do 'literally nothing at all'
do not omit.""
Third, it is claimed that the only interesting cases of omission
are those where the "actor" has directed her mind to some threat-

MOORE, supra note 1, at 28 (footnote omitted).
" See George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA.
88

L. REv. 1443, 1444 (1994).

o See Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1738-40.
91See generally H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION

(1949).

See generally LAWRENCE DAvis, THEORY OF ACTION (1979).
See generally HORNSBY, supra note 64.
94 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 95 n.46 (citing other unified theory mental action
theorists and those such as Myles Brand and C.J. Moya who have discussed the
theory).
" Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1444.
93
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ened state of affairs and to her capacity to prevent it, and where she
chooses not to prevent it. As Fletcher puts it, "the only kind of
omitting that is interesting is the kind in which human agency is
assumed."9 6 And again:
"Agency is built into the standard
example of the bystander who lets the child drown. The example
would not even be interesting unless we assumed that the bystander
chose to remain motionless and that she had an unrestrained option
97
to intervene and rescue the child."
None of these three reasons, as I now propose to show, go any
distance towards justifying the narrower conceptualization of
omissions over my broader notion. Consider the last point first,
Fletcher's lack of interest in nonwilled omissions. If Fletcher is like
the rest of us, he probably has two sorts of interests that are
relevant here, explanatory interests and moral interests. That is, he
seeks a conceptualization of omissions that is explanatorily interesting-because omissions (rightly conceived) explain things-and/or
that is morally interesting-because omissions (rightly conceived)
either capture a kind of moral responsibility, or they are the
contrast case to something else that does capture a kind of moral
responsibility.
Now consider two sets of omissions Fletcher finds interesting
enough to mention them in his own article: (1) "failing to water the
plant, when one reasonably expects the contrary, causes it to
die"; 8 and (2) "the failure to register for the draft, or the failure
to pay one's income tax."99 Fletcher finds the first explanatorily
interesting, yet notice, there is nothing in the example to suggest a
willed nonwatering of the plant. The person who watered the plant
may simply have forgotten to water it. We expect that people who
care enough for plants to own them will water them, and this
expectation may make the omission to water explanatorily interesting to us-but not because there is any of Fletcher's "human agency"
or "choosing" not to water the plant in the person whose omission
Fletcher finds explanatorily interesting.
Fletcher finds the second set of examples morally and legally
interesting because we can justly blame people for failing to pay
their income or social security taxes and for failing to register for
the draft. Yet we blame people for these omissions irrespective of

96 Id.
97

rd.

Id. at 1448.
99 Id. at 1447.
98
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any choice not to do so. "I forgot" is no excuse here, because such
forgetting would be negligent. Negligent omissions are surely
interesting to Fletcher, but not because there is any of Fletcher's
"human agency" or "choosing."
The problem of negligent omissions plagues the first reason as
well. Granting that we hold persons responsible for such items, the
unified view of actions-as trying, willing, intending, agency, etc.draws a blank in accounting for them. If omissions must be
intentional in order to be omissions, we shall need another name
for negligent omissions. In which event the supposed unity of acts
and omissions-in terms of some common element of intentional
agency-is illusory.
I should have thought all of this was perfectly obvious since
Bentham, who recognized that we cannot at the same time conceptualize omissions as willed and also capture the class of things that
holds our moral interest with this conceptualization."' As I said
in Act and Crime in discussing Bentham's rejection of Fletcher's and
Hornsby's conceptualization: "As Bentham himself recognized,
many omissions are not willed yet they are punishable ....
Negligent omissions.., are not willed omissions because one's
mind was not directed to the situation calling for the action
omitted." °1
Coming to the second reason, the supposed absurdity of dead
men omitting, there is indeed something odd in the kind of usages
Fletcher's example illustrates. It is not odd to say that we all omit
to feed a given beggar in India, even though we do not know who
he is or what his needs might be. It is odd to say that Caesar
omitted, to prevent the ascension of Hitler to power in 1933, or that
after our own deaths we omit to treat our friends well. The
difference is that in the former case we could prevent the starvation
of the beggar, whereas in the latter cases dead persons can do no
preventing because they can do no things at all. They lack, that is,
any ability to cause anything, being dead and all.
Such an oddity has nothing to do with the presence of "human
agency" or intention in the former cases and not in the latter, as
Fletcher suggests. Willing, thinking, directing one's mind to it, and
so on, are all completely irrelevant to the oddity to which Fletcher
directs our attention. There is not much point to saying that dead
" See BENTHAM, supra note 37, at 72 n.1.
10! MOORE, supra note 1, at

24.
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men omitted to do some particular type of act when we know, being
dead, they have (and will continue) to omit to do all types of acts.
We could treat this usage oddity as semantic, in which event we
restrict our concept of omissions to those noninstantiations of some
type of action by those who could have performed an act of that
type if they had chosen to do so. Or we could treat this usage
oddity as I do in Act and Crime, as only a pragmatic oddity. °2
Saying that a dead person omitted to save some child on a given
occasion is odd in the same way as it is odd to respond to the
question, "What caused the fire at the drugstore last night?," with
the answer, "The presence of oxygen in the air." Telling people
what we the speakers know they already know is pragmatically
deviant even if semantically impeccable.
Conceptualizing omissions my way will indeed mean that there
are "trillions of omissions on the part of each person at any
moment," as Hornsby notices. 103 I do not see why that is a problem, so long as one recognizes that almost all of these omissions
lack the surprise that would make them explanatorily interesting
and lack the features of negligence, knowledge, or intention that
would make them morally interesting. And remember: One cannot
restrict omissions to those that are willed, chosen, intended, and so
forth, because that manner of conceptualization fails to include
omissions we do find to be morally and explanatorily interesting.
Hornsby recognizes this fact when she admits that she has no
conceptualization of omissions to give that is narrower than my
account and yet accommodates negligent and inadvertent omissions
as omissions.14
I still think my broader conceptualization is
preferable: the generic notion of an omission is simply the absence
of an action of a certain type, leaving more restrictive notions to be
carved out as our interests require.
B. Supposed Motionless "Actions"
A second set of concerns raised about my conceptualization of
omissions focuses on omissions as absences of bodily motions. This
0 6
is the objection of Corrado 10 5 and Fletcher"
that motionless

102 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 28 n.31 (explaining that I adopt the generic notion
of omission).
103Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1739.
104 See id.
105See Corrado, supra note 44, at 1538-41.
106See Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1445, 1448.
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states of a person, when willed by them, are actions on their part,
and that therefore my notion of omissions is too broad in this
respect too.
Before dealing with this objection, we need to clarify a preliminary point on which Fletcher, but not Corrado, seems curiously
confused. Fletcher says that I have different "line[s] of thought" in
107
my definition of omissions.
Fletcher thinks that my conceptualization of omissions as the
absence of any willed bodily motions is different than my conceptualization of omissions as the absence of any act-token that instantiates the type of action omitted. The fact that I pointed out at the
Symposium that this was a mistaken interpretation of me by
Fletcher has resulted in his current, coy footnote, in which he
declares: "Alas, we must go by the printed page and not by the
preference of the author."'
By all means. The printed page to
which I referred Fletcher during the Symposium was page twentyeight of Act and Crime:
An omission to save X at some time t is just the absence of any
instantiation of the type of action, 'saving X.' On the metaphysical
view of actions developed in [chapters 4 through 6], actions are

event-particulars of a certain kind, namely, willed bodily movements.... An omission by A to save X from drowning at t is just
the absence of any willed bodily movements by A at t, which bodily
movements would have had the property of causing X to survive
the peril be faced from drowning.09

There is no distinct concept of omissions here; only the plugging in

of my positive theory of action to my generic notion of an omission
to say what it is that is absent when an action is absent.
Fletcher's confusion here is more serious than just confusing
species and genus. It also leads him to misunderstand the specific
notion of omissions as the absence of willed bodily movements.
Fletcher thinks that if there are willed bodily movements by A at t,
then there is no omission by A at t. For example, "not voting is
hardly the absence of bodily movement. One could be engaged in
an infinite variety of activities in the time one should be voting."" 0 Yes, but unless those activities instantiate the type of
' 7 Id. at 1444.
" Id. at 1445 n.ll.
"9 MOORE, supra note 1, at 28.
11 Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1452; see also id. at 1448 ("[W]hether the mother
remains motionless as her baby dies is totally irrelevant" to whether she omits to save
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action in question, namely voting, one is still omitting to vote by my
criteria for an omission. What Fletcher fails to put together is that
it is the absence of willed bodily movements that instantiatesome type
of act V that is an omission to V; mere presence of bodily motions at
the time in question is irrelevant.
I thought that I had made this relatively clear in Act and
Crime."' My example was the person, A, who omits to throw a
rope to another, B, who is drowning. A dances ajig in celebration
as B drowns. Is A now an actor? Yes, although plainly not a killer
12
of B because A's dancing is not "causally relevant to B's death."
Does the fact that A is an actor at t preclude A being an omitter
at t? Not in the least. A omitted to will any bodily motions that
were relevant to preventing B's death. He did not, for example,
throw a rope to B. A therefore omitted to save B while A did
something else, namely, dance. (To be blunt, I think I deserved a
more careful reading here by Fletcher; and if he omitted to read
this passage at all, it was an omission for which I cheerfully hold
him fully responsible.)
Let us now come to the "motionless actor" objection proper.
Consider first this proposed counterexample from Corrado:
Suppose ...

that I was sitting in the car at the top of a hill, and

that for reasons having nothing to do with my being in the car it
began to roll down the hill. I have my hands on the wheel, but
there is no occasion to turn, since the road is straight. If I run

down my enemy .... am I not liable for killing her? s
I think the correct answer to this is plainly a "no." Corrado has not
done anything by sitting motionless in the car with his hands on the
wheel. (He may have trouble proving that he did nothing to cause
his enemy's death, but it is, as Corrado said at the Symposium, his
hypothetical, and we can know with the certainty of an omniscient
novelist that Corrado did not move.)
Corrado apparently thinks that the motion of the car makes
some difference here. Yet by hypothesis, the "driver" did nothing
to start the car's motion. The motion of the car is irrelevant, as is
the corresponding motion of the "driver" that is not willed or
caused by him. 114 Corrado no more kills in his hypothetical than
her baby).
11 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 29 (arguing that the mere presence of bodily
motions at the time of an omission does not make it any less of an omission).
112Id.
11

Corrado, supra note 44, at 1540.

14 As

Aristotle noted long ago with his example of a man not acting when he is
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he would if he were thrown off a cliff by the wind, his body landing
on his old enemy and thereby causing the latter's death.
Corrado presents a variation of his motionless driver hypothetical where our sense of responsibility and of action is stronger:
I am driving down a long, straight highway; the car is on cruise
control, and I am not moving the wheel ....
Suddenly and
unexpectedly I see an old enemy standing in my lane about two
hundred yards ahead of me. Her back is turned; she does not see
me approaching.... Thereafter I do not move, and the car runs
5
over my old enemy, killing her."
Surely, Corrado concludes, he killed the woman, yet he, Corrado,
was motionless.
Corrado anticipates most of the five things I want to say about
this case. The first is whether the driver does kill his old enemy
because the driver's earlier willed bodily motions in starting and
driving the car caused the death in question. Corrado puts aside
this anticipated response by me because there is no culpable mens
rea existing in the driver at those earlier times, quoting me to the
effect that culpable mens rea must be simultaneous with the
wrongful action.1 16 This is true enough for the ultimate question
of responsibility and liability, but it does not deal with the metaphysical question of action. For I do think that the earlier acts of
driving are sufficiently proximate that they caused death, and
therefore the driver did kill his old enemy. The intervening
omission to turn does not alter that analysis.
But Corrado is right in his conclusion on liability: We cannot
hold the driver liable for his earlier acts, because even though they
were acts of killing, they were not caused or even accompanied by
culpable mens rea. So consider, secondly, whether we should fudge
1 17
this question in the way invited by the Model Penal Code.
According to the Code, we only need find a larger "course of
conduct" included in which is some willed bodily motion.1 18 We
are thus invited to say that the whole sequence of starting to drive,
driving, and then remaining motionless is one "course of conduct,"
that at some point during its happening a culpable mens rea arose,

carried by the wind. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 52 (Martin Ostwald
trans., 1962).
15 Corrado, supra note 44, at 1538.
16
' See id. at 1538-39.

11 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1985)
18

Id. at 218 cmt. 1.
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and that this larger whole both caused death and includes within it
some willed bodily movements. This sloppy analysis, although
common enough," 9 is unacceptable because of its unprincipled
mode of aggregation of actions into one "course of conduct." This
accordion-like concept invites the kind of skepticism I explore
20
briefly in Act and Crime.'
Nor can one deal with Corrado's second kind of case with the
third possibility here, the true doctrine of "embedded omissions"
that I explore in Act and Crime. The Graham Hughes/Hyman Gross
analysis would treat the absence of any movement turning the wheel
as a circumstance in the presence of which the accused performs the
(positive) action of driving.'' Yet Hughes and Gross cannot so
analyze this case, because the acts of the driver are done before the
relevant time during which the omission to turn occurs. One
cannot thus treat the failure to turn as a circumstance in the
presence of which positive actions are done. Only the effects of
positive actions are continuing when the driver sees his old enemy
in the road, and on my theory of action these effects (such as
122
movement of the car) are no parts of the earlier acts of driving.
Fourth, in some of the cases Corrado imagines there may well
be either the kind of displacement-refrainings or resistings that I
explore shortly herein. These are cases where an actor either moves
one part of the body in order to keep another still, or he resists an
outside force that would move his body unless he exerts himself. In
Corrado's hypothetical, however, he stipulates that he is only
"lightly resting [his] hands on the wheel and failing to move
them."

123

That leaves only the fifth and last possibility for holding his
"driver" for some form of homicide. This is the possibility I relied
upon during the Symposium: the driver is liable, not because he
intentionally killed his old enemy, but rather, because he innocently
caused (by his earlier willed bodily motions of driving) a condition
of peril for his old enemy that makes it his duty to rescue him. It
is like lowering a safe over another that then breaks away: if I can
'" Fletcher, for example, seems to buy into this way of.thinking, although he
wrongly thinks that I join him in it. See e.g., Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1445 n.8.
10 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 35-37 (explaining that the act requirement is
fulfilled only if one can find a voluntary act by the defendant accompanied at that
time with the requisite mens rea).
' See id. at 31-34 (explaining the Graham Hughes/Hyman Gross analysis).
122See id. at 280-301.
123 Corrado, supra note 44, at 1538 n.30.
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prevent the safe from falling by no more than flipping a safety
catch, I surely am duty-bound to flip it. If I omit to flip the switch
with a culpable mens rea, then I am liable for my omission. As I
discuss such cases in Act and Crime, these are cases of true omission
liability.12 4 They are not, however, counterexamples to my analysis of action.
Corrado objects that I cannot finesse his counterexample in this
way. The creation-of-peril exception to omission liability
does not fit the case at hand: I did not create the situation that
put my victim at risk. She did, by standing in the road and not
looking out for herself. My presence
in the road is perfectly
25
reasonable-I did not create the risk.
But he did. His presence in the road is reasonable but that has no
bearing on the innocent causation of the condition of peril exception. His victim may be unreasonable, and she may have contributed causally to her own peril, but that also does not take Corrado out
of the exception. He put a force in motion that if he does not stop
or redirect will kill. He thus has a duty not to omit to stop or
26
redirect this force, which duty he culpably fails to fulfill.
Fletcher too seems enamored of supposed motionless actions.
His example:
Suppose that one of the guards at Buckingham Palace enters into
a conspiracy with outsiders to kill the Queen. His signal to them
about when they should bomb a certain portion of the palace is his
remaining motionless an extra five seconds after the other guards
begin to change their posture.... He contributes
to her death by
27
signaling that the bombing should proceed.1
But this is easy for my theory. The guard caused the coconspirators
to understand where the bomb should be placed by his earlier act
of telling them where to place the bomb; his only caveat was that
124See

MOORE, supra note 1, at 34.
125Corrado, supra note 44, at 1539.
126

Corrado makes two other worrisome points: (1) the punishment should be less

if there is true omission liability than it would be for killing; and (2) true omission
liability may not be as infrequent as I assume in Act and Crime. See Corrado, supra
note 44, at 1539-40. In reference to (1), as I argue shortly in response to Freeman,
some positive duties may be quite stringent, such as the duty to save one's own child.
Stopping whatever we have put in motion from killing is surely also more stringent
than our general moral duty to rescue strangers whom we have not imperiled. In
reference to (2), I actually think that it takes considerable contrivance to manufacture
counterexamples like Corrado's. Fortunately for my theory, the real world is not

often so devious.
127 Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1447-48.
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they were not to so place the bomb if he signaled them not to do so
by moving with the other guards. The guard then omitted to so
signal them by remaining motionless. The earlier act of speaking
involved bodily motions, and thus was an action; when the speaking
caused Austinian uptake with the coconspirators, it then became an
act of communicating. The act done was not an act of signaling, as
Fletcher believes, for that is precisely the kind of act he omitted to
do by standing still. The earlier act of communication the guard
did do is enough aid to make the guard liable even under traditional complicity doctrines, let alone under the more lenient Model
128
Penal Code or Pinkerton doctrines of complicity.
Fletcher elsewhere considers a variation on the Buckingham
guard:
Tourists regularly pause and stare in wonderment at the motionless guards standing in front of Buckingham Palace. Standing
without moving for a few minutes is a feat worthy of praise at least
as much as doing a back flip off the diving board. And standing
12
motionless on one's head is an even greater feat.
Shortly before he gives this example Fletcher complains that I have
given a "reckless summary of a complicated literature" on omissions.13
Yet if Fletcher had followed the cross-references I gave
in that summary of that literature, he would have seen that both
that literature and I had dealt precisely with his kind of case. In Act
and Crime I quote Myles Brand, for example: "'The policeman who
keeps his arm at his side and does not shoot the fleeing youth
refrains from shooting him ....
Idiomatically, we would simply say
that he refrains from shooting the fleeing youth by keeping his hand
by his side. Refraining, then, is one type of action.' 131 In Act and
Crime I also quote the case posed by Julia Annas: "[W]hat about
omissions and cases where acting involves precisely not moving the
body? Suppose the boy stands on the burning deck, whence all but
he had fled? It is his standing which is his action, and this involves
no bodily movement, unlike his coming to stand there."'3 2

...
See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645 (1946) (holding that
coconspirator can be found guilty of all substantive offenses committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy even if they were not directly involved in the commission of the
substantive offense); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985) (defining the liability for the
conduct of another).
129 Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1445.
's Id. at 1444 n.6.
's' MOORE, supra note 1, at 88 (quoting Myles Brand, The Language of Not Doing,
8 AM. PHIL. Q. 45 (1971)).
122

Id. at 88 n.26 (quoting Julia Annas, How Basic Are Basic Actions?, 1978 PROC.
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Fletcher's hypothetical adds nothing to those of Brand and Annas,
and so I shall simply repeat my reply to them, to Fletcher.
Briefly, I use another portion of the literature Fletcher would
like to see used in a nonreckless way, an article by Bruce
Vermazen. 3 3 We should distinguish, Vermazen tells us, "resistings" and "displacement refrainings" from Brand's more generic
"refrainings." "A resisting occurs when an agent's body is about to
be made to move by outside forces, but he keeps his body from
moving by activating the appropriate muscles." 13 4 Fletcher's
example of standing on one's head is a good example of resisting,
where Vermazen and I would conclude there is an action. For in
such cases the actor constantly adjusts his muscles in order to keep
gravity from moving his body. As long as we "reconstrue 'bodily
movements' to include muscle-flexings, "1s5 as we should in these
cases where we use our muscles to resist an outside force, there is
nothing inconsistent with my theory of action in concluding that
such resistings are actions, not omissions.
A displacement refraining occurs when the actor keeps one part
of his body from moving by moving another part of his body.
Vermazen's example: Andy, who is tempted by food in front of
him, keeps himself from eating it by twisting the buttons on his vest
(which keeps his hands occupied so that they cannot reach for
food).13 A more common variation: Alice lights up and smokes
a cigarette in order not to eat. There is obviously no problem for
my theory of action in concluding that actions occur in such cases
even as one is omitting to do certain other actions.
About Brand's and Annas's examples of refrainings more
generally, as about Fletcher's Buckingham Palace guard, my
conclusion in Act and Crime still stands: "[S]uch refrainings are not
actions."'3 7 Standing still may become so difficult physically that
it is like standing on one's head, in which case it will become a
resisting and thus, on my account, an action; yet as Annas's example
of the boy "frozen" to the desk illustrates, one usually stands still
and in standing still does nothing at all.

195).
"' See id. at 88-89 (relying on Bruce Vermazen, Negative Acts, in ESSAYS ON
DAVIDSON: ACTIONS AND EVENTS (Bruce Vermazen & Merrill Hintikka eds., 1985)).
134 Id. at 87 (quoting Vermazen).
l..
Id. at 88 n.24.

ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y

137 See id. at 87.
"' Id. at 88.
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C. Omissions as Causes?

A third set of worries about my conceptualization of omissions
stems from my denial that omissions cause anything. Recalling my
view that omissions are "literally nothing at all,""3 8 I defend Julie
Andrews's view in The Sound of Music: "Nothing comes from
39
nothing, and nothing ever could."
Among the Symposium participants only George Fletcher appears
to challenge this aspect of my theory. Unfortunately Fletcher
merely contents himself with asserting what I deny. Fletcher asserts,
"But surely, unexpected nonmotion could be the cause of
death."14 Fletcher recognizes that I think the opposite: "Moore
says that he has an argument against omissions as causes, but I find
no case against the plausible position of Hart and Honor6 that
failing to water the plant, when one reasonably expects the contrary,
14
causes it to die." '
Fletcher did not look very hard. In Act and Crime I address six
separate arguments against any notion of causation that would allow
omissions to be causes.14 1 Since Fletcher did not find those arguments, or in any case does not address them, I shall not repeat them
here. About examples like failing to water the plant, notice that
Fletcher's use of "causes" here need mean no more than the
counterfactual: in the possible world where we do water plants,
then, all else being equal, they do not die. This is a true causal
generalization connecting actions of watering with states of
continued plant life. It is this generalization, and not some causal
relation between a particular omission to water and the death of
some plant, that we invoke when we loosely talk of omissions
causing things to happen.
Fletcher does better with his legal observation that when our
criminal system does hold omitters liable, it sometimes does so
43
under statutes prohibiting killings, maimings, and the like.
Since on my own showing these verbs of action require a causing of
death for their correct application, our law must presuppose that
138Id.

at 28.

..Julie Andrews & Christopher Plummer, Something Good, on RODGERS &
HAMMERSTEIN'S THE SOUND OF MusIC: AN ORIGINAL SOUNDTRACK RECORDING (RCA

Records 1965).
140Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1448.
141Id. (footnote omitted).
142See MOORE, supra note 1, at 267-76.
143See Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1450.
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omissions can be causes. Fletcher is right about our law; our law is
simply wrong about the metaphysics, as is Fletcher. 144 AngloAmerican criminal law cannot make omissions be causes when they
are not. It can only require those who apply it to come up with
some substitute for causation in the case of omission liability; and
this we easily do with the counterfactuals mentioned earlier.
D. Killing/LettingDie and Act/Omission

Finally, there are a host of interesting thoughts introduced by
Frances Kamm's article14 1 that promise to supplement my act/
omission distinction with other distinctions she finds to be morally
salient. Kamm agrees with my conceptualization of the act/
omission distinction: "[A]n act is a willed movement, an omission
is a nonact of a particular sort, and... omissions do not cause
events."146 Kamm focuses on the morally salient act-type killing,
to supplement the act/omission distinction with two other distinctions.
The first is the distinction between killing and letting die. This
distinction is drawn with the aid of two background distinctions:
(1) where the act is the original cause of death versus where the act
only removes a defense against some force that will actually cause
death unless the defense remains in place; and (2) within the
removal-of-a-defense-against-death cases, where the actor removes a
defense he himself was providing versus where the actor removes a
defense independent of any that he was providing.'4 7 A killing is
an act that either is an original cause of death or is a removal of a
defense against death that was being enjoyed by the victim independently of any provided by the actor. 4 A letting die, by contrast,
occurs when the actor's act is not an original cause of death and is
only the removal of a defense against death that had been provided
by the actor herself.'4 9
Kamm's second distinction is within the class of killings and,
indeed, within that subclass of killings that are killings because each
is an act that is an original cause of death. Within this subclass
144See

MOORE, supra note 1, at 267-76 (arguing that omissions cannot be causes).

45 See F.M. Kamm, Action, Omission,and the Stringency of Duties, 142 U. PA. L. REV.

14934 (1994).
6

1

Id. at 1495.

47

See id. at 1497-98.
148See id. at 1498.
1

149See

id.
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Kamm wants to distinguish some killings that "have practically the
same moral weight as the letting die by actively terminating aid,"
because such killings only cause the death of someone who was
dependent upon the actor for some defense against an otherwise
naturally occurring death. 50 For example, the person providing
another with life support stabs him rather than terminating the life
support and letting nature take its course.
Kamm recognizes that these two distinctions have some affinities
with the "relativized baseline test" I put aside as a test of act versus
omission. 51 For both the letting die and the lesser wrong killings
analogized to letting die do no more than return the victim to the
status she would have been in absent the actor's initial help. My
refusal to use the relativized baseline test as the basis for drawing
the act/omission distinction does not mean I reject the moral force
of Kamm's distinctions. On the contrary, I agree with Kamm on the
moral force of the distinctions; the only question is how to
conceptualize that moral difference.
Kamm and I also agree that the act/omission line is not to be
conceptualized in this way. Where we disagree is whether the cases
she calls letting die are not cases of killing. I think that they are
killings, only killings of such lesser wrong that they (along with
Kamm's original cause killings of dependents) are eligible to be
52
justified much more easily than are ordinary killings.
To see this alternative conceptualization of her cases, think first
of a quite different sort of case, one like Bernard Williams's case of
"Jim."l5 1 In my variation, the actor, "Jim," is confronted with a
macabre choice: if he selects one innocent villager out of fifteen
assembled before a firing squad, that one will be shot but the rest
will live; if Jim makes no selection, all fifteen will be shot. I am a
deontologist about killings, so that one has an agent-relative moral
duty not to kill.' 54 Nonetheless I think Jim ought (or is at least
permitted) to make his selection, for by doing so he is not killing.

His act of selection is certainly an act; it enables another to kill; but
150 Id.
151 MOORE,

supra note 1, at 27.
"' I explain the idea of killings, torturings, and other wrongful acts being "less
wrong" when done in certain circumstances, and being thus more eligible for a
consequentialist override of any agent-relative prohibition, in Michael S. Moore,
Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REv. 280, 315-27 (1989).
153SeeJJ.C.SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 98-

99 (1973).
15

See generally Moore, supra note 152.
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the act is not a killing because it is not the proximate cause of
death. 55 Between that act and the death that it enabled intervened the free, informed voluntary choice of the captain of the
squad to kill.
Since killings are acts causing deaths, Jim does not kill.
Therefore his act of enabling death does not violate the agentrelative prohibition against killing. But can we say the same of
Kamm's cases of letting die? When we turn off the respirator of the
patient whom we ourselves are keeping alive with it, and the patient
dies, there is no "break" in the "causal chain" between our act of
flipping off the switch and the patient's death. We therefore kill the
patient just as surely as does an intruder who does the exact same
sort of action with the same sort of result.
We thus must locate the moral force of Kamm's letting die/
killing distinction elsewhere. I would locate it as a partial exception
to the moral norm against killing.156 When all in a lifeboat will
die anyway, it is permitted to kill one in order to save the rest.
When a flood comes down a canyon, it is permitted to kill the
occupants of a farm by removing a dike that would have protected
them, if that was the only way to save all in a village from death in
the flood. These are the well-known "already dead" and "distribution" exemptions, 7 relieving us from the rigors of deontology so
as to permit killings to be justified by sufficiently good consequences.
What such exemptions show us is not that these acts are not
killings. Rather, they show us that such acts are sufficiently less
wrong that good consequences-consequences which would not
justify ordinary killings-may justify these kinds of killings. Such
lessened wrongness also attaches to Kamm's cases of letting die and
of killing of dependents. Given this lesser wrongness, such killings
are much more easily justified by good consequences than are
ordinary killings. This is why I said in Act and Crime that any
relativized baseline conception of the act/omission distinction "can
be used to smuggle notions of justification in" as supposed
differences in action.15
I still think it preferable to keep this
differential for potential justification out in the open, which
155 See id. at 311-12.
-' See id. at 302-05, 310-11.
157Id.
158MOORE, supra note 1, at 27.
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requires that acts of letting die be recognized for the killings that
they are.

15 9

IV. OMISSIONS: NORMATIVE ISSUES
A. The Variability of Wrongness and Liberty Limitations
in ParticularCases
Samuel Freeman and George Fletcher introduce a pair of
difficulties that, while distinct, share a common solution. Freeman's
point has to do with the lesser wrongfulness of violating our positive
duties to act, or not to omit, as compared to the greater wrongfulness of violating our negative duties not to act. 6
Freeman
concedes (at least arguendo) that in any pair-wise comparison, a
negative duty might be more stringent than its positive counterpart-the duty not to kill is more stringent than the duty to prevent
loss of life-yet he denies that all negative duties are stronger than
any positive duty: "Many failures to improve the world enormously
61
outweigh in moral heinousness many acts that make it worse."
Freeman's example: It is more wrong to let a stranger's child drown
when she could be saved at no risk and minimal effort than it is to
62

steal the child's purse.1

By this observation, Freeman means to question one-half of my
justification for not punishing most omissions on retributive
grounds. I argue that while some failures to act are wrongful, they
are not nearly as wrongful as their counterpart evil actions, so that
the demand for punishment and retributive justice is less strong in
the former cases than in the latter.
Fletcher questions the other half of my account of why we byand-large do not punish omissions, even when these violate a moral
duty and are therefore wrongful.'63 The other half of my account
159 I am unclear whether Kamm wishes to call duties not to do original cause
killings of dependents and not to let die (where such duties exist) negative or positive.
I suspect that she thinks that it violates a positive duty to let die and that it violates
a negative duty to kill dependents (in those situations where such duties exist);
whereas I think all killings-which include many of Kamm's letting die cases-violate
a negative duty, if they violate a duty at all. We probably disagree about where the
negative/positive line is most fruitfully drawn even though we may have no
disagreement about the relative moral stringency of any of these moral duties.
160 See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1462-64.
161Id. at 1463.
161 See id.

163 Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1450-51.
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is a liberty argument: A law that (positively) coerces the doing of
some action takes away more liberty than does a law that (negatively) coerces the not-doing of some action. Fletcher accurately gauges
the intuition behind this idea: on an opportunity-set conceptualization of liberty, a requirement to do some act A effectively prohibits
one from doing acts B, C, D, and so on, whereas a requirement not
to do some act A only prohibits one from doing A."6
Fletcher raises two objections to this intuition. First, "[w]hether
a demand or a prohibition is more noxious depends on the content
of that which is demanded or prohibited."" 5 Fletcher opines that
prohibiting certain sexual practices (such as sodomy) may be more
liberty-limiting than requiring the use of condoms. 166 Second,
whether liberty is taken depends on the actor's wants. Not being
able to do acts one has no desire to do does not take away any
167
liberty.
Fletcher's second point rejects the opportunity-set notion of
liberty, so I shall reserve my consideration of it until later.
Freeman's point and Fletcher's first point can be combined to
articulate a single objection: some omissions may be sufficiently
wrong, and the liberty diminished by a positive requirement that
such actions not be omitted may be sufficiently small, that a
retributivist ought to urge the punishment of such omissions. My
generalobservations about differentials in wrongness and liberty may
well be correct, and yet together they will notjustify a blanket policy
of not punishing omissions.
One might agree with Freeman's point that some violations of
positive duties are morally worse than some violations of negative
duties, and one might agree with Fletcher's point that some
affirmative requirements impinge liberty less than some negative
prohibitions. There would then be a theoretical possibility that we
should criminalize more omissions than we currently do. Yet one
would want to see the examples. Freeman's example that the
wrongness of omitting to save the child is greater than the wrongness of stealing the child's purse will not do because the liberty
differential is still there. It diminishes liberty less to prohibit theft
than it does to require lifesaving activities. Fletcher's example
'6 See id. at 1451.
16 Id. at 1450.
1 See id. Freeman raises a similar objection to my claims about liberty. See

Freeman, supra note 3, at 1479.
167See Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1456.
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comparing the liberty diminished by a prohibition of sodomy versus
a requirement of condom usage will not do because the wrongness
differential still exists. From the moral viewpoint (that I do not
share) that regards "deviant" sexual practices as wrong, these acts
will be much greater wrongs than the omission to wear a condom
in "nondeviant" sex. On such a view of morality, acts of sodomy
should be punished, and the omission to use a condom should not,
because of this differential in wrongness-even conceding Fletcher
his desired reversal of the normal liberty differential between the
negative prohibition -and the positive requirement.
Aside from waiting for better counterexamples-ones where the
wrong to omit is serious and the diminishment of liberty by the
positive requirement is minimal-there is something else that needs
to be said here that was not said in Act and Crime. Frances Kamm
gets at this with her observation that "there are cases in which a
negative duty is more stringent than a comparable positive duty,
even though failing to perform the negative duty would make the
world better. For example, I must not euthanize someone against his
will even though death would be in his interest. " "'
Kamm is surely right to separate the stringency of moral duty
from the degree to which nonfulfillment of a duty will make the
world better or worse. Good or bad consequences are not the
measure of the stringency of an agent-relative duty. We should also
separate, as Freeman does not, stringency of moral duty from the
moral heinousness of the character of the person violating the duty.
Beneficently motivated killing can violate a very stringent moral
duty and yet evidence a not-so-heinous character in the killer.
Kamm thus rightly focuses on the stringency of moral duty to
the exclusion of these consequentialist and characterological
considerations. Kamm's explanation for the differential stringency
of negative over positive duties is in terms of rights-based (as
opposed to only rights-correlated) duties.'69 Negative duties are
grounded in the right of each person to "a certain sort of inviolability of the person" whereas positive duties are not.170
Positive
duties may have correlative rights in the victims of their violation,
but they are not rights-based duties.
Although I find Kamm's suggestion interesting and worth
pursuing, my own explanation for the differential in stringency
16 Kamm, supra note 145, at 1495-96.
169See id.
70

1 Id.
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between negative and positive duties is different. Consider three
duties: (1) the (negative) duty not to kill; (2) the (positive) duty to
prevent the death of one's own child; and (3) the (positive) duty to
prevent the death of a stranger-child. Freeman is right that I am
not enough of a libertarian to deny that we have each of these
moral duties. 171 I do deny that the third is an agent-relative
obligation, whereas the first plainly is. We ought not to kill even in
situations where our doing so would prevent more killings by
ourselves or others in the future; yet one cannot say the same of
when we ought to prevent the deaths of strangers. If we confront
one stranger-child in the water needing rescue, we are surely
entitled not to save her if, by swimming to a larger group of
drowning children, we can save them. Our duties not to omit are
consequentialist (or "agent-neutral") in their nature. Such duties
are, for that reason alone, not among the stringent duties we call
"deontological" or "agent-relative" duties, and the wrong of violating
such duties is correspondingly less.
Some positive duties nonetheless may approach the stringency
of negative duties in that such positive duties are plausibly thought
to be agent-relative. The second duty above, the duty to save one's
own child, is such a duty. I take it that we at least have an agentrelative permission to favor our own child over another-or even over
several others-equally in need of rescue.' 72 But we also have an
agent-relative obligation to save our own child even if doing so
means we cannot rescue some number of others, and this agentrelative obligation to rescue compares favorably (in terms of
stringency) with the agent-relative obligation not to kill. Might not
I be obligated to kill an innocent if doing so was the only way to
save my child? (Even if this last question is to be answered
negatively, the difficulty of answering it indicates the near parity in
stringency of the two duties.)
In any case, the distinction between agent-relative and agentneutral duties at least explains the across-the-board greater
stringency of all negative duties versus (almost) all positive duties.
It may also explain why some positive duties are nearly as stringent
supra note 3, at 1461-64.
agent-relative permissions are part of what Tom Nagel calls "reasons of

171See Freeman,
172Such

autonomy." THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 166-71 (1986). On agentrelative permissions, see generally SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS

(1982).
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as their negative counterparts, a moral fact recognized by our
criminalizing omissions that violate such stringent positive duties.
B. Liberty as a GeneralFreedom to Act
In addition to their questioning of the differential amount of
liberty taken away by criminalizing positive duties as opposed to
negative ones, Fletcher and Freeman also question the opportunityset notion of liberty that makes sense of such quantification.
Fletcher's objection, as we have seen, depends on his thesis that
liberty is want-relative in the sense that someone must want to do
some action A before coercion against A limits that person's
liberty. 7 ' This is surely wrong. Think of the old conundrum
about false imprisonment: If the victim does not know of the
confinement because she never desires to leave the room, has she
been confined?'74 Surely the answer is yes, for the wrong of
confining another and the loss of being confined are objective
matters that do not depend upon the subjective state of mind of the
victim. Happy slaves are still slaves. They may not want to do
anything other than what they must do, but they are still slaves
because they are not free.
Freeman has a more interesting basis for rejecting any opportunity-set notions of freedom.175 Freeman shares with Ronald
Dworkin (and many other nonlibertarian, egalitarian liberals) the
rejection of any value to the natural liberty to do whatever one
might wish:
[S]urely there is nothing intrinsically valuable about the natural
liberty to do wrong ....
To assign intrinsic value to natural
liberty as such would imply that legal restrictions per se diminish

this intrinsic value and that there is ethical loss with the imposition
of any legal restriction. But what could that loss be in the case of
76
legal restrictions on clearly unjust or evil conduct?
Freeman thus rejects my idea that there is value in our natural
liberty even when we exercise it so as to "make the wrong
choice." 17
Rather, Freeman thinks that there are only basic
171See

Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1451.

174 Prosser's answer (even in torts, where there must be a compensable injury) was

.no." See generallyWilliam L. Prosser, FalseImprisonment: Consciousnessof Confinement,
55 COLUM. L. REv. 847 (1955).
175 See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1484-86.
176 Id. at 1486.
177MOORE, supra note 1, at 57.
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liberties, those more discrete rights such as the right to speak freely,
178
to think, and to worship as we please, and the like.
This is doubtlessly not the place to launch a defense of this wellworn question in political philosophy. Freeman is accurate in
gauging what view of liberty underlies my brief references to liberty
in Act and Crime.17' For I do think that there is value in each of
us having the natural liberty to do what we please, including the
liberty to violate Freeman's "perfect duties" (that is, to make the
wrong choice).'" ° This liberty is the basis of the right of each
citizen to be free from legal coercion not exercised for legitimate
reasons; the correlative duty of each legislator being to enact
criminal laws only in pursuit of those reasons. Those legitimate
reasons for criminal legislation include punishing culpably done
wrongs, but the good of punishing culpable wrongdoers must
outweigh the bad of coercively interfering with choice.
It is a mistake to confuse this right to natural liberty with the
much narrower, but much more powerful, right to noninterference
with certain sorts of decisions. What we think or say, what religious
experiences we value, what sexual practices we admire, and whether
we decide to have children, are part of what makes us who we are.
They are aspects of a more powerful basic liberty that is easily
confused with the broader but much weaker natural liberty. If one
distinguishes these two different liberties, then one can agree with
Freeman that "however this list of basic liberties is drawn up in the
18
end, it will not include a liberty to violate perfect moral duties."
It will not, because the choices that can violate such duties are not
the sort of self-defining choices protected by the more basic right to
liberty. Freeman thus attributes a view to me that I do not hold
insofar as I am said to think that "inchoate 'liberty' itself is an
intrinsic good worth protecting whatever the costs." 8 '

The basic

liberty to define oneself may be so worth protecting, but a general,
natural liberty certainly is not. But that is not to say that the
general, natural liberty is not valuable at all.
Why is there any value in a natural liberty that includes a liberty
to do wrong? Why should we be free of legal coercion when what
we are coerced to do is our own perfect duty? Consider Freeman's
178 See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1485.

See id. at 1486.
110 Id. at 1488.
171

181Id.
82
' Id.

(emphasis added).
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own example, Kant's imperfect, ethical duty of beneficence.
Suppose that those of us who could easily afford it were under a
duty to give a portion of our income to the poor. As Freeman
notes, Kant wished "to make it a matter of an individual's discretion
to choose when to fulfill this duty and whom one should benefit as
a result."'83 After all, to be coerced into giving is hardly to give
at all, and in any case, a coerced "giving" is not nearly so virtuous
as a voluntary giving. Is not this concern perfectly general:
whenever the law coerces, it cuts into the possibility of freely chosen
good. The value of natural liberty lies in the possibility of autonomously chosen good, recognizing that the price a legal system pays
for such a possibility is a matching possibility of a greater number
of unmet duties.
C. Legality Worries About Omission Liability
George Fletcher raises a little noticed problem about criminal
liability for omissions that is not addressed in Act and Crime, which
is that Anglo-American penal codes do not always spell out what it
is one must not omit to do.'8 4 Homicide statutes prohibit acts of
killing, for example, but there is no analogous statute criminalizing
failures to save another when that other dies but could have been
saved. Rather, our criminal codes rely on the simple statutory
prohibition on killing, together with the case law defining when
there is a duty to prevent death, in order to criminalize omissions
to save.
Fletcher finds there to be a "wholesale breach of legality in the
judicial development of duties that supplement the law of homicide.""8 ' There are actually two legality worries here. The one
apparently troubling Fletcher is the existence of nonstatutory law
that spells out when there are affirmative duties to prevent harms
such as death which one is statutorily prohibited from actively
causing (such duties exist for parents, undertakers of rescue,
culpable or innocent causers of the condition of peril, and the like).
There is also another legality worry about the present criminalization of certain omissions, which stems from the metaphysical fact
that an omission to save, even when a death ensues, is not a

Id. at 1476.
" See Fletcher, supra note 89, at 1450.

183

'R5Id.
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killing. 6 Statutes prohibiting killings thus do not command acts
of saving lives any more than those prohibiting burnings, maimings,
or kidnappings command acts of burn-prevention, disfigurementprevention, or asportation-prevention. It is only because courts
analogize the failure to save a life that could have been saved, to
killing, that allows them to punish omissions to save life under our
homicide statutes. This smacks of "crimes by analogy," one of the
practices frowned upon by the doctrine that there are no common
18 7

law crimes.

Given the moral and metaphysical views presented in Act and
Crime, the second of these legality worries would seem more serious
than the first. Not only are omissions to save not killings, but acts
that are killings are the more serious moral wrong, even when
saving is obligatory and not merely supererogatory. The enactment
of omission statutes would thus be desirable for two reasons:
(1) such statutes would command actions (prohibit omissions) that
now are punished despite not being anywhere by statute required;
and (2) such statutes would attach lesser penalties to the omission
to save than to active killing, a lesser punishment juries and judges
now typically give anyway but without statutory guidance or
authorization.
D. Demonstratingthe Comparative Strengths of Negative Versus
Positive Duties: Kamm's Post-Efforts Test
Frances Kamm agrees with me that negative duties are more
stringent than positive duties, and she sees that I support this
188
common conclusion with what she calls a defeasibility test.
Kamm helpfully seeks to supplement my use of a defeasibility test
with what she terms her "post-efforts" test.18 1 What this test asks
is what efforts would be morally appropriate to require of someone
in order to prevent a harm he has either begun to cause by his
action or begun to omit to prevent by his inaction.
Kamm actually relies on two different ways of applying her test.
The first asks what the actor or omitter should feel compelled to do
in order to correct or prevent the harm. Kamm's example: The
would-be killer who had almost drowned a baby should have to offer
186 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 267-78.
187 On legality, analogy, and common law crimes, see id. at 240.
198 See Kamm, supra note 145, at 1494.
189See id. at 1501.
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her life if doing so (for example, by giving her last breath underwater) would revive the submerged infant; yet the would-be omitter to
save a drowning baby should not have to make this kind of sacrifice
in order to save the life she previously had omitted to save.
Kamm's second application of the test is ask what we could
properly do to the actor/omitter after she has started to act or omit.
To use her example again: We may kill a person who is drowning
a baby in order to prevent the baby's death whereas we may not kill
an omitter even if that will save the baby she is omitting to save (for
example, by giving an incentive to the person standing next to her
not to continue to omit to save the baby). From both of these sorts
of applications of her test Kamm concludes that killings are worse
than omissions to save.
I have two worries about the post-efforts test. My first worry
corresponds with Kamm's third-person application of the test.
There is a gap between both preventative and corrective justice, on
the one hand, and retributive justice on the other. As the literature
on moral luck rather abundantly illustrates,190 we often have
preventative and corrective duties that have a different character
than the duties giving rise to retributive deserts. I may have reason
to prevent, correct, and regret harms that I have caused or am
innocently causing, but that does not mean that I should be
punished for such innocently caused harms.
I may have no
retributive desert even though I have strong preventative and
corrective duties.
My second worry corresponds to Kamm's first-person application of her test. Here, we are testing retributive desert, because we
are asking what we may do to someone who is killing/omitting to
save in order to get her to stop/start. My fear is that we are not
testing anything but pure retributive intuitions about comparative
deserts: we may do more to prevent the would-be killer's killing
than we may to induce an omitter to save a life because killing a
killer is less wrong than killing an omitter;' but this last is only
true because killers have greater moral deserts than omitters. Yet
this conclusion was the "direct intuition" about just deserts that the
post-efforts test was to supplant or at least supplement.

" Reviewed and discussed in Michael S. Moore, The Moral Significance of
Wrongdoing, 5J. CONTINUING LEG. ISSUES (forthcoming 1994).
" This goes back to my earlier discussion, see supra note 152, of how some
killings, although wrongful, can be less wrongful from even an agent-relative view of
morality.
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I say all of this rather provisionally because I welcome all the
help I can get in arguing for the difference in moral stringency
between positive and negative duties. Perhaps Kamm's post-efforts
test can be reformulated so as to avoid these difficulties, or perhaps
these are not real difficulties, in which case hers is a welcome
addition to my more familiar defeasibility test.
V.

CONCURRENCE OF ACT, CAUSE, AND KATZ

Leo Katz in his contribution to this Symposium19 2 restricts his
focus to the relationship between the voluntary act requirement and
the other elements of the prima facie case for criminal liability. In
Act and Crime, I defend the standard view of that relationship: the
accused's voluntary act must simultaneously exist with, and in some
cases be caused in the right way by, his culpable mens rea, and that
act must itself cause some legally prohibited result.19 Leo Katz
disagrees. He denies that the causal linkage of mens rea-voluntary
act-prohibited result is sufficient for even prima facie criminal
liability (prima facie liability is liability without considering excuses
or justifications typically raised by the defenses); and he denies that
the extent of blameworthiness is governed by this relationship.
Katz presents fourteen alleged counterexamples to my concurrence principle. I am confident that not a one of Katz's cases is a
true counterexample to my principle. I cannot go through them all
in any great detail. I shall thus discuss the first of Katz's examples,
show the various reasons making it not a true counterexample, and
then show how these reasons equally well handle all the rest of
Katz's examples.
Katz's first example is that of Alex and Bruce: Alex outruns his
companion, Bruce, so that the bear eats Bruce rather than Alex.'
Alex performs a number of voluntary acts in running. He does so
knowing that the bear will kill Bruce so long as Alex runs faster than
Bruce. His voluntary acts in some sense are causally related to
Bruce's death at the paws of the bear (if Alex did not run, and
Bruce did, Bruce would still be alive). Thus, Katz concludes, this is
"9See Leo Katz, Proximate Cause in Michael Moore's Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L.
REv. 1513 (1994).
'9s See MOORE, supra note 1, at 35-36.
19 This is one of what Katz calls the "ducking" cases. See Katz, supra note 192, at

1516-18.
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"a pretty unequivocal illustration of an act that proximately causes harm
195
but does not entail liability."
Yet this is not a counterexample to my concurrence principle,
for four reasons. First, in some of the "ducking" cases the one who
ducks (or runs) is not the proximate cause of the harm because the
free, voluntary act of a third party intervenes. This might be true
of the bear in the above hypothetical. It is certainly true of other
of Katz's ducking cases, where Alison either switches briefcases or
covers her official U.S. government seal, with the desired result that
another (Beatrice) is killed by terrorists. The terrorists intended to
kill, meaning (on virtually anyone's notion of an intervening cause)
that Alison did not proximately cause death (that is, she did not do
the legally prohibited action of killing).
Even if we thought that both Alex and Alison were prima facie
liable, they are not actually liable because they were justified or
excused by one defense or another. This means that their ultimate
non-liability is not a counterexample to my concurrence principle,
which only states a sufficient condition for prima facie liability.
Each of the next three reasons raises one such possible defense.
Consider first the consequentialist version of the balance-of-evils
defense. Alex's loss of life would be as great an evil as the loss of
Bruce's life, and mutatis mutandis for Alison vis-4-vis Beatrice. As is
well known, sometimes one can justify otherwise prohibited killings
by balancing lives. This is permissible either: (a) when the killing
is not your project but is someone else's; or (b) when the killing is
done only by redirecting a force already in motion from its natural
victim to another. 9 6 Bernard William's example of the first is
where you are requested to decide who will be shot, but you do no
shooting; and in default of a choice by you, all will be shot.197
Judy Thomson's example of the second is where a flood will engulf
an entire village, killing all of its inhabitants, but you may prevent
that by redirecting the flood onto one farm, killing only its inhabitants. 198
Katz's "ducking" cases fit both of these exemptions from the
rigors of deontology, permitting consequentialist justifications to
operate. Of course, Alex is trading one life for one, as is Alison.
The evils thus are evenly balanced. One might well think, however,
195 Id. at 1518.

See Moore, supra note 152, at 302-15.
See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 153, at 98-99.
198 For citations and discussions, see Moore, supra note 152, at 304-05.
196
19
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that such a defense ought to be governed by a tipping principle:
when the evils are even, the accused does no net evil by killing.
Katz anticipates the possibility of consequentialist justifications
here. He therefore alters his example:
[S]uppose that Alison had known she would only be mishandled
by the terrorists (perhaps because one of them knows her) but that
Beatrice would be killed. She too would still have been entitled to
duck (which in this case, of course, means covering her suitcase
with an Air Libya sticker)."' 9
This eliminates even a parity between the evil caused and evil
averted, and so no consequentialist justification is possible.
Yet this variation reveals the presence of two more defenses
lurking to relieve duckers from ultimate liability. One might have
(as libertarians in particular often do) what is sometimes called a
rights-based view of justification."' On this view we each have an
agent-relative permission not to balance evils but to prefer ourselves
to others on certain occasions, (for example, a person otherwise
unable to prevent a crotch grope except with the use of deadly force
may use that deadly force against the would-be groper.) 20 1 One
might also think that we each are entitled to favor our own life (or
the lives of those near and dear to us) over the lives of others, when
someone must die. On such non-consequentialist versions of
justification, we are justified in ducking.
Alternatively, we often excuse people who do a greater evil in
order to avoid a lesser one.20 2 Such people are not justified on
consequentialist grounds and they may not be justified on rightsbased grounds. The instinct for survival or the fear of loss of one's
own life or bodily integrity may be such that we find it understandable that one could not be a moral hero. Running from a bear as
fast as one can is surely one such example.
These four reasons recur to remove any sting from many of
Katz's examples. Certainly the tale of the sailor and his daughter
(Katz's second example)20 3 offers all four possibilities, being
another sort of ducking case. Sometimes what saves the individual
' Katz, supra note 192, at 1518.
00 SeeJOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 182 (1987). Such rightsbased conceptions ofjustifications are really agent-relative permissions to do acts that
do not maximize good consequences.
201See State v. Philbrick, 402 A.2d 59 (Me. 1979).
2012
On necessity as an excuse, not as a justification, see Michael S. Moore,
Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1102-03 (1985).
205See Katz, supra note 192, at 1518-19.
2

1800 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1749
from ultimate liability is the agent-relative justification for his action
(the third of the possibilities mentioned above). Thus, Daniel Drew
(Katz's fourth example)1 4 is entitled to leave a slip of paper that
others can "take advantage of" only if they are willing to trade on
confidential information.
Lincoln (Katz's fifth example)2 5 is
entitled to state the literal truth even though he knows it will
mislead his audience, given his agent-relative permission to speak
freely in the political arena. Given these justifications for conduct,
these situations can hardly be counterexamples to my thesis about
26
prima facie liability.
In two of Katz's examples, the third and the sixth, it seems that
Katz is just wrong in denying that there is prima facie liability.
Ethelbert, the would-be rescuer in Katz's third example who begins
to rescue his old enemy, "sloughs him off, as it were, and swims
back by himself."217 If sloughing him off is an act, as Katz says it
is, then Ethelbert is liable for homicide. That Ethelbert fits Kamm's
category of a letting die (or perhaps of an original cause killing of
a dependent)0 8 does not matter. As I argued earlier, 219 these
are killings, and all Kamm's categories do is make killers eligible for
consequentialistjustification. Ethelbert has no such justification, so
he is not only prima facie liable, but is ultimately liable as well.
Likewise, Veronica, Katz's sixth example, 211 is liable for
mayhem in taking the drug prior to conception in order to cause
the child she (conditionally) intends to conceive to be born without
an index finger. Surely we are past the conceptual problem that she
need not have conceived the child at all, so she can conceive it in
any shape she pleases-the old "greater power includes the lesser"
fallacy. Surely we are also past the old notion that she cannot owe

204
20.

See id. at 1519-20.
See id. at 1520. Alternatively, some may think that Lincoln did wrong, but if

that is so, he is still not a counterexample.
2' Notice that sometimes such justifications do not make their appearance as
defenses. At such times, thesejustifications appear as either the absence of mens rea
(for crimes of negligence and recklessness, which require unjustifiedrisk-taking) or as
the absence of actus reus (where we say that an act that literally violates some statute
does not in law violate such statute because it was justified). On both points, see
Moore, supra note 152, at 284 n.4. When justifications operate in these latter two
ways so as to defeat the prima facie case, they still present no counterexample to my
concurrence principle. Remember that that principle requires concurrence of mens
rea and actus reus, and where one or the other is absent, there is no concurrence.
207 See Katz, supra note 192, at 1519.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 145-52.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 156-59.
210 See Katz, supra note 192, at 1521.
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a duty to the unborn or unconceived. Why then does Katz think
that this is "a strong example of an act... proximately causing harm but
not constituting a crime"?2 ' Presumably because Katz thinks she is
justified by an agent-relative permission: she is justified because she
will only take the drug if she will conceive, which she will only do if
conceiving a finger-defective child is the moral thing to do (which
Katz thinks it is because such a minor defect should not bar
conception). Whereas I think she would be justified in conceiving
at t2, knowing of the defect, but that she is not justified at t, in
taking the drug in order to cause the defect.
With this sixth example, Katz is really letting the cats out of the
bag. All of the examples in his paper from here on share a common
form: the agent seeks to find a permissible route to an outcome
that is legally prohibited unless justified. Such agents either try to
find some agent-relative permission or excuse for their action, in
which case they are not ultimately liable because they are either
justified or excused; or they seek to remove their actions sufficiently
so that they are not the proximate cause of the legally prohibited
state of affairs, in which case they are not even prima facie liable.
Sometimes they fail in their manipulative attempts, and therefore
are ultimately liable, despite what Katz says. All of Katz's remaining
examples fit into one of these three possibilities, none of which are
problematic for my concurrence principle.
Septimus, the surgeon, curious about what it would be like to
operate drunk, is not liable. 212 First, he was not the proximate
cause at t,, when he got himself intoxicated, because of the
coincidence of a patient's needing him, and although his drunken
acts at t 2 were the cause of the patient's injuries when Septimus
operated, he was justified in operating (even when drunk) because
no one else was available. Obediah, the Charles "Death Wish"
Bronson of dog-haters, 213 is liable at t, for provoking the dog to
attack him so that he could defensively kill it at t2; the dog's
provoked response is not an intervening cause, and Obediah's
justification at t 2 for shooting the dog in self-defense is not a
justification at t1 for provoking the dog so as to kill him. (Nor is
Obediah justified at t, by retrieving the toy, since the manner of
retrieval-"sudden, startling, and aggressive" 2 4-was not necessary
211Id.
212See
21sSee
214Id.

id. at 1521-22.
id. at 1522.
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to retrieve the toy and was only done to provoke the dog.) The
Patty Hearst-like heiress215 is not liable, because her acts at t, of
releasing her bodyguards do not proximately cause her bank
robbery at t2. If Katz succeeds in eradicating the intervening acts of
the kidnappers or their agents in his more fanciful variations of this
case, 2 16 then the heiress may have proximately caused her own
"duressed" bank robbery and is liable. Katz thinks not, I gather,
because he thinks the heiress is legally privileged to release her
bodyguards for any reason. If Katz were right about this, then she
would be justified at t, and would not be ultimately liable (even
though the concurrence of voluntary act, mens rea, and causation
at t, would make her prima facie liable).
Mathilda, who refuses to learn CPR in order not to save her
husband, 217 did not cause anything, proximately or otherwise, by
her omission. While she had a duty not to omit to save him if she
could do so at t 2 (when he suffers a heart attack), she has no duty to
learn CPR at t,. Even though the act omitted at t, could have saved
him, let us suppose, absent the duty there is no liability. She no
more has to learn CPR than she has to become a doctor in order to
2 18
jump on Macauley's train to Meerut.
Alaric, another Machiavellian dog-killer, 219 has engineered his
justified killing of the dog at t2 in a sufficiently roundabout way that
I doubt that his walking around the neighborhood is the proximate
cause of the dog's death. He is not liable. (And if I am wrong
about this, then he is liable, but he is still not a counterexample.)
Ulysses, the last of Katz's curious drunkards, 221 is liable (as Katz
admits) because his drunken acts of violence cause injury. His
voluntary intoxication is no excuse under present law. Katz would
change this, excusing him if he was: (1) cautious at t, about where
and when he got drunk, and (2) so drunk at t 2 when he hit the
visitor that he did something he would not have done sober. Even
with law that Katz would prefer, why would this prima facie liable,
but ultimately excused individual, present a counterexample?
Katz's regular trolley, regular surgeon, and twisted trolley
scenarios in part III of his article all have to do with when conse215See id. at 1522-23.
216 See

id. at 1523 n.36.
217See id. at 1523.
218 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 55.
29 See Katz, supra note 192, at 1523.
22 See id. at 1523-24.
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quential justification is permissible: It is permissible when the force
(original trolley) is redirected and not when one originates the force
that kills (surgeon, twisted trolley). It is also permissible when one
redirects force with the knowledge that this is the only way to kill
one to save five since they may not be saved later (original trolley
redux). So what? In all variations there is prima facie liability
because of the concurrence of voluntary act, causation of death, and
mens rea, even if ultimate liability varies because of the presence or
absence of a balance of evils justification.
Katz has forgotten his hope of criticizing my concurrence
principle; instead, he has focused on the development of an insight
that motivates his forthcoming book.2 2' Katz is interested in the
path-dependence or formalism of agent-relative morality and of the
criminal law that often mirrors that morality. He is thus fascinated

by examples of manipulated justification and manipulated excuse.
He has convinced me that these examples form the basis of a
marvelously interesting book. These examples, however, have very
little to do with my concurrence principle. The overlap of the two
topics is found in their common focus on the question of the actor's
liability. About this issue: I sometimes think there is no prima facie
liability because of the lack of a proximate causal connection
between the earlier manipulative act and the ultimate harm; I
sometimes think there is no ultimate liability because, while there is
a proximate causal relationship, there is ajustification for so acting
at that earlier time; sometimes I think there is a proximate causal
relationship and that there is no justification for so acting, leading
to ultimate liability. In the first set of cases, Katz often disagrees
with me about proximate causation; in the third set of cases he
often disagrees with me about the availability of some unspecified
agent-relative permission to do the earlier manipulative act, even
when done with the intent to kill, maim, and so forth. In neither of
these classes of cases should our disagreement (about whether
causation or justification is present) be mistaken for a disagreement
about the concurrence principle. And even in the second set of
cases, where we agree that there is no ultimate liability, our
disagreement is about the meaning of the concurrence principle,
not about its truth. I construe the principle such that it is not

"' See generally Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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violated by cases where the defendant was justified whereas Katz
construes the principle differently.
At the very end of his piece Katz hints at the system with which
he would replace the concurrence principle. The idea seems to be,
that an actor should get credit if, after his initial act is done with
culpable mens rea, he seeks to prevent those effects that will make
that act wrongful and illegal. For example, the defendant starts a
boulder rolling toward his old enemy in order to kill him but then
has second thoughts and seeks, unsuccessfully, to stop the boulder.
Katz is right about where "the Moorean approach" goes in such
cases: this is a murderer, and the early onset of remorse does not
change that fact in the least. Katz might wish to reform the law
here to provide for a partial defense of abandonment; but whether
there were such a defense is of course irrelevant to the truth of the
concurrence principle, which only deals with prima facie liability.
VI. TESTING THE VOLITIONAL VERSION OF THE VOLUNTARY ACT
REQUIREMENT: SOMNAMBULISM, HYPNOSIS, AND
DISSOCIATED STATES AS ACTIONS?

Stephen Morse and Bernard Williams examine my theory of
action by exploring its implications for the criminal law's voluntary
act requirement in certain problem cases. These cases are somnambulistic behavior, behavior under or due to hypnosis, and what
Morse more generally characterizes as behavior performed when the
"actor" is dissociated in some way. The concerns of Morse and
Williams are rather distinct, so I shall consider each separately.
A. Macbeth, Caligari,and Williams
In applying my theory of action to these problem cases in
chapter 10 of Act and Crime, I am not seeking to answer the
question of whether these are actions so much as I am illustrating
the questions we should ask in order to determine whether these
are actions. 2 ' Although Williams believes that these behaviors are
actions and I do not, our main disagreement is about the kinds of
arguments that are persuasive here.
Consider four arguments, the first being the argument from
ordinary usage. In Act and Crime, I urge that the idiomatic usage of
the ordinary verbs of action to describe somnambulistic behavior is

2-2

See MOORE, supra note 1, at 256-57.
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not a strong basis for the conclusion that these behaviors are
actions.22
I attribute the contrary view about the persuasive
power of ordinary usage to Herbert Hart, Douglas Husak, and
Bernard Williams.22 4 Williams now agrees that "this would not
have been much of an argument" and disclaims having made it.225
This is fair enough, but Williams then goes on to attribute a form
of a linguistic argument to me.226 1 am supposed to think that we
can distinguish between literal and metaphorical uses of action
verbs (because we can distinguish "actions" predicated of a human
body from actions predicated of a person), and on this usage basis
tell whether some behavior is really an action or only looks like an
action but is not. Williams then points out that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to separate English predicates into person-applicable
predicates and body-applicable predicates. In addition, predications
of somnambulistic behavior seem "to be paradigmatically the kind
of predicate that is applied to a person." 227 For these reasons,
"[i]t is only if we have already decided that there is something
peculiar about these predications that we would start to look in that
direction."228
I agree with this last thought of Williams. It is only because we
have other grounds for thinking that somnambulistic behaviors are
not actions that we have reason to explain away ordinary usage with
something like my literal/metaphorical usage distinction. I did not
think there was any positive argument to be made either way from
these or any other facts of usage of action verbs.
So Williams and I apparently agree that ordinary usage cuts no
ice one way or the other about how to classify these problematic
kinds of behaviors.
What, then, are better arguments here?
Williams's discussion introduces three other sorts of arguments.
The first certainly sounds like an argument from usage. It has to do
with how we should describe what Caligari and Cesare do when
Caligari directs the somnambulistic Cesare to stab the town clerk
with a dagger, and the town clerk dies. Williams's description is
that Cesare "kills (as we would naturally put it) the town clerk with
229
a dagger."

23

See id. at 252-53 & n.1l.

See id.
' Williams, supra note 2, at 1664.
226 See id. at 1665-66.
227
Id. at 1666.
22
22

8

id.

Id. at 1670.
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Williams argues for this characterization thusly: The town clerk
was stabbed with a dagger. Caligari did not stab him with a dagger,
although we might say that Caligari brought about the town clerk's
death by a stabbing. Therefore, there being only two possible
stabbers on these facts, it must have been Cesare who stabbed the
town clerk with a dagger. Since Cesare's stabbing of the town clerk
with a dagger resulted in the town clerk's death, Cesare killed the
230
town clerk with a dagger.
There are two ways to complete this argument. One is the
direction taken by Morse, who urges that the killing by Cesare was
an action of his, albeit one for which he will most likely be excused. 23 ' The other is Williams's direction:
We should not have to struggle with these difficulties. Cesare...
stabbed the town clerk. But he did it when he was asleep ....
Whatever the best description, we can see how it is on these facts
that Caligari is guilty of murder with respect to these deaths and
Cesare is not, but that is not because no stabbing... was done by

Cesare.

22

Williams does not quite say that Cesare's stabbing and killing of the
town clerk was an action, for he recognizes that there are "various
dimensions in which what is done may fall short of the paradigm of
fully voluntary action, " 233 and somnambulism presumably shares
some such dimensions.
In criminal law, we cannot afford Williams's nonchalance about
this question. Whether Cesare acts or not matters (1) to whether
Caligari can be charged with murder himself, or only as an
accomplice to Cesare's murder, and (2) to whether the prima facie
case for murder can be made out for Cesare. Williams doubtlessly
thinks of these as criminal law-driven distinctions only, and the
lawyers will just have to work it out in light of the criminal law's
distinctive purposes. 234 I, on the other hand, take the criminal
law's distinctions here to be one of the criminal law's attempts to
cut nature at the joints-the metaphysical question of whether Cesare
performed an action determining the legal question of which theory
of liability is appropriate for Caligari and Cesare.
230 See id. at 1670-71.
231 See Morse, supra note 18, at 1650.

232 Williams, supra note 2, at 1671-72.
233 Id. at 1072.
24 See supra text accompanying notes 2-18.
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Morse's alternative completion of the argument, while tempted
by Williams's kind of metaphysical agnosticism, nonetheless takes a
position on somnambulism, viz., it is action and, therefore, if there
is no liability for Cesare, it is only because he is to be excused. 3 5
Morse thus forces us to confront how Cesare's stabbing could not
be an action. Notice that one should get off Williams's chain of
inferences right from the start: just because the town clerk was
stabbed with a dagger does not mean that someone stabbed him
with a dagger. Imagine that a dagger is negligently left on a window
sill and it falls and stabs the town clerk below. He was stabbed and
killed with a dagger, but no person performed the act of stabbing.
Imagine a variation on the scene depicted in a film about the never
caught mass-murderer in Texarkana: A trombone player is stabbed
to death by a knife attached to the trombone, the trombone itself
worked by an elaborately contrived machine turned on by the killer.
The victim was stabbed with a dagger, but we may think that the
killer did no stabbing. 23 6 Thus, to prosecute someone for killing
the town clerk by stabbing, we need not find a stabber, only a killer.
Caligari did kill the town clerk: his acts of directing Cesare caused
the town clerk's death.2 37 Cesare, on the other hand, did no
killing and did no stabbing (even though Cesare's body was causally
implicated in a stabbing and a killing)-indeed, Cesare the person
slept through the whole nasty business At the very least, there is
nothing in this little story that argues against this last characterization. We are still left looking for arguments one way or the other.
A second additional argument might be based on the behavioral
facts about these cases that are so very striking. As I note in Act and
Crime, somnambulistic and hypnotic patterns of behavior are so
responsive to the environment, so seemingly intelligent, that these
cases tempt one to conclude that such behaviors are really actions
persons perform. 238 Williams is also impressed by this behavioral
fact and at times seems to think it sufficient for the conclusion that
somnambulistic behaviors are actions:

23' Morse, supra note 18, at 1650.
256 As Williams recognizes, see id. at 1671 n.23, I am probably more lenient than
most in relieving ordinary English verbs from any very severe means-restrictions as
part of their semantics. See MooRE, supra note 1, at 235-38. Even so, the window-sill
and "trombone-"playing killers from the text need not do acts of stabbing in order
to cause both a stabbing and a death.
27 See MooRE, supra note 1, at 225-35.
2See id. at 249.
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There is no doubt that Lady Macbeth has picked up the light,
found the door, undone its bolt, and carefully come down the
stairs. Moreover, it is not a matter of a mechanically determined
routine which merely looks as though it were responsive to
perceptual cues; some somnambulists ... will walk around pieces
of furniture that are not in their normal place. So
why should we
29
say that these movements only look like actions? 1
This sounds like the Gilbert Ryle of 1949, who thought that all
there was to mind and action was behavior and dispositions to
behavior. 24
Against those who would attribute hidden, internal
causes for such patterns and dispositions, Ryle was prone to parody.
Against the internal cause view of, say, mental disease, Ryle urged
that we would not be able to tell on such a view whether "the inner
lives of persons who are classed as idiots or lunatics are as rational
as those of anyone else. Perhaps only their overt behavior is
disappointing .... ."41
Ryle was wrong, and so is Williams to the extent he shares the
argument. We have as good a reason to suppose that human
actions form a natural kind of event as we do for mental diseases,
physical diseases, intentions, species, elements, and other objects of
scientific theorizing. Such natural kinds, including human action,
may well have a hidden nature, so that surface indicators such as
behavioral patterns and dispositions may well be misleading about
certain examples. My theory of action provides a theory about that
hidden nature in terms of volitions. To argue that behavior
patterns and dispositions are sufficient for there to be human
actions is to assume that a natural kind theory of action such as
mine is false. Assumptions are not arguments, however, and until
my theory is falsified, it is not much of an argument for somnambulistic behavior being an action to say that they sure do look like
actions.
Perhaps Williams could be interpreted as suggesting that such
intelligent and environmentally responsive patterns of behavior are
possible only if such behaviors are caused by volitions-in which case
he would be using my theory to argue that somnambulistic and like
behaviors are really actions. So construed, Williams would have to
29 Williams, supra note 2, at 1667.
2140See generally GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949). Ryle realized that

a behaviorist interpretation of him was not strictly accurate, but that it was close
enough to be a harmless misreading.
241

Id. at 21.
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confront two points I make in Act and Crime. The first is that quite
intelligent and responsive routines are guided by initiating and
correcting states that are subpersonal, that is, no person ever has
access or direct control over such states.242 We know that this is
true at some level of guidance for the most conscious and voluntary
of actions; there is no reason why it might not be true at all levels
of guidance for certain sorts of behavior such as somnambulism.
The second point is that when we are asleep we lack the consciousness that marks the divide between the personal and the subpersonal.24 Williams would have to argue that there is some other
divide besides consciousness, but it is unclear what that would be.
Since this is more Morse's line of attack than Williams's, I shall
defer discussion of it until the next Section. Williams tells us that
somnambulistic behavior is "purposive," or "explained by reasons," 244 and this is the last argument of his that I shall consider.
Williams's main reason for his apparent conclusion (despite his
occasional metaphysical agnosticism) that the somnambulistic
behaviors of Lady Macbeth are actions, stems from his view that her
behaviors are "purposive," that they have an "intentional contour,"
that "they are explained by the kinds of reasons by which they
would be explained if she were awake," that she did what she did
because of her "aims" while asleep. 245 As Williams concludes:
"[H]er actions are purposively the same as actions that she might
have performed when awake, and the same with respect to the
reasons that we could ascribe to her.... [A]ctions of this kind have
246
an intentional or purposive aspect."
I would of course agree that if Lady Macbeth acted purposely,
or acted for a reason when she wandered about asleep, then she did
act. Anything that is both F and G is certainly an F, no matter what
the predicate represented by F might be. That of course is not
Williams's point. He must see for Lady Macbeth's behavior while
asleep an explanation by reasons, and from that he concludes that
these must have been actions, because only actions are explained by
reasons.
242 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 152-53.
243 See

id.

244Williams,

supra note 2, at 1664.

245Id.

246

Id. at 1664-65.
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The question is thus whether her sleep behaviors are explained
by reasons. This is not nearly as simple a question as Williams
seems to think. First, we must distinguish justifying reasons from
explanatory reasons. Lady Macbeth could have "had a reason" for
opening the door in the sense that she had good reason to do such
a thing. Notice that in this justificatory sense of "reason," she could
also have "had reason" to open the door even while lying in bed fast
asleep. For instance, there was a fire and to survive it was necessary
to open the door to ventilate the room. Only explanatory reasons
are of course relevant to assessing whether her opening the door
was an action.
Next, notice that not all desires that causally explain behaviors
are explanatory reasons. For example, my desire to beat someone
in chess causes my heart rate to go up; my desire to get out of
prison causes me to rattle the bars in my cell window in frustration;
my nighttime desire to wake at a certain time the next morning
causes me to wake at that time.247 Such "mental cause" explanations
do not provide reasons for action. Typically lacking are both a
means/end belief accompanying the desire, such as a belief that if
I rattle the bars in my cell window I might escape, and any executory intention or volition whereby I exercise my agency in response to
such desires. The desires simply cause the behaviors, and, as the
above examples illustrate, such genesis in desire in no way guarantees that the behaviors are actions.
Behaviors can thus be desire-responsive without being actions.
This is true even when the behaviors seem cleverly to find their way
to satisfying the object of the desire which produces them.
Suppose, for example, that Freud's explanation of dreams was true:
every dream represents the fulfillment of a desire, and dreams are
caused by such desires."' Freud dreamt that a real-life patient of
his, Irma, was improperly injected by a fellow doctor, Otto, who in
waking life had reproached Freud for his failure to cure Irma.
Freud recalled that he was irritated with Otto and disappointed in
himself; he thus wished for exoneration and for revenge. Suppose
that the dream indeed depicts the fulfillment of Freud's wishes for
exoneration and for revenge, and suppose further the dream with

247 1

mention these in MOORE, supra note 1, at 256. They are explored at greater

length in MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 8, at 15-18, 291-301.
241

in

I explored this in Michael S. Moore, The Nature of Psychoanalytic Explanation,

MIND AND MEDICINE:

PROBLEMS OF EXPLANATION

BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 5, 43-59 (Larry Laudan ed., 1983).
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that content was caused by these desires. Does this suggest that
Freud's dreaming was an action of his-a kind of play put on for his
own enjoyment while he was asleep, there not being much else to
do? Not in the least. The desire for revenge and for exoneration
may have caused the dream, and the dream cleverly responds to
these desires by
depicting their satisfaction, but Freud did no action
2 49
in dreaming.
The same is true of somnambulistic behavior. There may well
be desires causing these behaviors. Such behaviors often cleverly
respond to desires by delicate maneuvering and adjustment, and yet
such behaviors are not actions because they are not the execution of
such desires by an agent forming the appropriate intentions or
volitions. If I am wrong about this, as I admit in Act and Crime I
could be, 25 it will be because there are such executing intentions
and volitions despite the agent's lack of consciousness. That, as I
also say in the book,2 5 1 would be to use my theory of action, not
to argue against it.
B. Morse on Dissociated "Actions"
Although sharing some of Bernard Williams's doubts about the
ability of any metaphysics to answer the question of whether
somnambulistic behavior is really an action, Stephen Morse is, like
Williams, also prepared to go some distance down my road to see
what there is to see. Morse begins his discussion "undecided about
[the] issue" of whether somnambulism is an action2 52 and ends his
discussion "still undecided."25 3 Nonetheless, he helpfully probes
my argument that somnambulistic behaviors are not actions.
Morse begins by rejecting my challenge to the readers of Act and
Crime to come up with a theory of action alternative to my volitional
theory.254 He chooses to assess my theory as applied to sleepwalking and other dissociated behaviors.2 55 Morse examines two sorts
of evidence in assessing the application of my theory to somnambu256
"the evidence from phenomenology and behavior."
lism:
249 See id. at 47-59.
2o See MOORE, supra note 1, at 259.
251See id.
252Morse,

supra note 18, at 1642.

25 Id. at 1651.
2'4 See id. at 1644.
255 See id.
2

-1

Id. at 1645-46.
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Behaviorally, Morse thinks that the evidence points to a volitional
causation of sleepwalking movements, that is, that "[tihe sleepwalker's behavior strongly suggests that a true intention caused the
goal-directed bodily movements."257
Morse is adverting to the
same behavioral facts that impress Williams and, indeed, all of us
about this class of behaviors: the responsiveness to the environment
and the seeming pursuit of ends and goals. Everyone should admit
that at least some somnambulism behaviorally looks just like
(volitionally guided) actions. Therefore, Morse's inference is that
they are volitionally guided behaviors, or (on my theory) actions.
Morse recognizes that I am not without a nonvolitional explanation for these behavioral facts: "It may well be that subpersonal
agencies within us are achieving quite complex functions in
these . . . kinds of case[s]." 258 Morse, however, raises two doubts
about my nonactional explanation of the behavioral facts. First, he
asks what further account I can give to "suggest that subpersonal
proto-actions are another natural kind" in addition to the natural
kind I posit human actions to be. 259 He also asks what reason is
there to think "that nature has endowed us with functional
subpersonal bare intentions to execute more general but still
260
subpersonal intentions?"
Take the second of Morse's points first. Let us first be clear
about what needs explaining. I would not say that there are
"subpersonal bare intentions" or "more general but still subpersonal
intentions." What I would say is what I said in Act and Crime: In
the case of somnambulism there are "volition-like states [that]
execute certain of our background states of desire, belief, and
general intention."6 1 I eschew the idea of subpersonal mental
states of intention, desire, or volition, because if they were only
subpersonal, they would not be mental states of intention or of
anything else. Mental states are states of whole persons.
This bit of precision matters because now what needs explaining
can be easily explained. The reason we have to think that some
truly subpersonal states guide sleepwalking behavior is because such
states do the micro-guiding of behavior when we perform normal
waking actions. In somnambulism, however, what is missing are the
257

Id. at 1646.

2-8 MOORE, supra note 1, at 257.
259 Morse, supra note 18, at 1645.

260 Id.
261MOORE, supra note 1, at 257.
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personal executory states of volition that would make such behavior
action. What (at least sometimes) is not missing are the desires of
the sleepwalker. These are not subpersonal desires or intentions,
as Morse attributes to me, but the desire of the sleepwalker in the
full sense of the word desire. Given the complexity, responsiveness,
and intelligence of certain somnambulistic behavior, it is reasonable
to hypothesize that some of the sleepwalker's desires and general
intentions are causing the movements and that the movements are
micromanaged by the same executory machinery (at the subpersonal
level) that micromanages our normal waking movements. That, at
least, is my alternative hypothesis explaining the behavioral facts to
which Morse adverts.
This answer to Morse's second point also goes a long way
towards answering his first point. What Morse demands is that I
come up with some hidden nature to somnambulistic behaviors that
show them to be a natural kind in the same way that I point to
volitions as the hidden nature of that natural kind we call human
actions. Moreover, Morse demands that I come up with a second
hidden nature for this second natural kind. This demand is part and
parcel of Morse's and Williams's assumption that my natural kind
analysis of action cannot countenance fuzzy edges and scalar
phenomena.

262

Yet the account that I give here is intended to capture the close
analogousness we all feel between sleepwalking and waking-walking
(that is, walking when that is an action). Sleepwalking shares some
of the same goals and desires of the whole person as wakingwalking; it also shares the same executory machinery at the
subpersonal level. It thus looks a lot like action, much more so than
reflex reactions, because it is a lot more like action than any reflex
reactions. Nonetheless, sleepwalking is not an action so long as it
is not volitionally caused, which on the evidence it does not appear
to be.
Morse also questions whether the evidence from phenomenology
evidences a lack of volitions in somnambulism. At one point Morse
analogizes sleepwalking to highway hypnosis and other forms of
habitual behavior that I concede to be actions. The phenomenological evidence, Morse thinks, is equally lacking in both cases:
"[T]he sleepwalker cannot tell you about her phenomenology while
she is dissociated, but neither can the admittedly volitional person
262 See

supra text accompanying notes 14-19.

1814 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1749
performing habitual action on 'automatic. ' " 263 Yet surely there is
still a difference between the two classes of cases. The driver "on
automatic" can quickly turn his attention to what he is doing if the
need to do so arises, while the sleepwalker has no conscious
attention to turn onto the details of his movements. Also, the
driver "on automatic" often can remember what he was doing if
asked soon afterwards, whereas the sleepwalker more typically has
no remembered phenomenology to report upon wakening.
At another point in his discussion of the phenomenological
evidence for the lack of volitions in somnambulism, Morse focuses
on memory. He posits that "[m]ost dissociation cases, such as
sleepwalking and fugue states generally, surely involve dynamically
unconscious states." 264 The states Morse has in mind are not
volitions, however, but only "the agent's general intention to kill,
assault, or the like." 265 Since Morse also thinks that "[t]here is no
reason to believe that unconscious agents might not recapture their
general intentions if exposed to various forms of psychological
methods," he concludes that "[o]n Moore's own account, uncon"2
scious agents may act. 11
I would get off this train of inferences before it leaves the
station, for I do not think that most dissociated states involve
dynamically unconscious intentions. The dynamically unconscious
is composed of those repressed mental states that Freud told us
could be recaptured in memory only by the extraordinary efforts of
free association, transference, or some other extraordinary memoryjogging technique. As I have argued elsewhere in detail, 267 I do
not think these sorts of unconscious mental states underlie much
behavior (and certainly not all behavior, as Freud thought).
Thus, if Morse were arguing that there are unconscious
intentions of the kind I call volitions, I would simply disagree on the
evidence. Rarely if ever does psychoanalytic or any other memoryjogging practice recover a memory of volitions and action (as
opposed to wish and desire). One of the examples I gave in Act and
Crime was the sort of phenomenal evidence Freud produced to
transform his accidental knocking of an inkwell into the action of
263
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"executing" the inkwell; Freud remembered his desire for a new
one, but he did not remember executing that desire into the
8
26
movement that fulfilled it.

This disagreement is somewhat idle, however, given what Morse
actually appears to be arguing. For Morse is not saying that there
are unconscious volitions, only unconscious general intentions.
These, he thinks, are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that an
unconscious agent acts. They are not, however. Recall that in my
account of somnambulism, there are desires and general intentions
that are not dynamically unconscious-they are fully accessible to the
sleepwalker when he is awake. That these nonrepressed desires and
intentions get fulfilled by somnambulistic behaviors does not make
those behaviors actions. A fortiori, that dynamically unconscious
desires and general intentions get fulfilled by somnambulistic
behaviors would not make such behaviors actions either. In either
case, the volitions that execute such desires and general intentions
are needed.
Despite these points and counterpoints, it remains true that the
behavioral and phenomenological evidence is far from conclusive on
the question of whether somnambulistic behaviors are actions.
Missing is a third sort of evidence that is crucial here: physiological
evidence showing what brain structures are needed to perform the
functions that volitions perform. Despite the studies on the
supplementary motor area of the brain referred to in Act and
Crime,269 our knowledge of the underlying structure is sufficiently
scanty that: (1) the basic question of "[w]hether volitions exist is
thus very much an open, scientific question," 27 0 and (2) "[w]e at
present do not know enough ...

about the modes of initiation of

[somnambulistic behavior] to resolve the issue definitively one way
or the other."27 This is why I said earlier that epistemically I am
in agreement with Morse and Williams about the lack of any certain
answer here.27 2
Despite the caution, I do go on in Act and Crime to give two
reasons for placing our "bets in the direction chosen by the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code:
bet that such
movements are not volitionally caused, and therefore are not
268

See MOORE, supra note 1, at 251-52.
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actions."2 3 The first of these reasons stems from the best theory
we have about self-boundaries, one in terms of consciousness:
"Consciousness seems essential as part of our self-boundaries, so
that if we (our conscious selves) are asleep or are otherwise not
271
active, then we don't will anything ....
Morse questions this argument in three ways. First, I do not
"adequately defend why the ability to be aware of one's volitions ... is required for action or personhood." 215 Second, my
criterion is degree-vague because I do not "indicate how much
consciousness is necessary." 27 6 Third, while according to Morse
too "[c]onsciousness does seem part of our self-boundaries . . . this
does not entail that the unconscious agent's movements are not actions." 27 7 Yet one can assess the force of all three of these points
only if presented with an alternative theory of how we demarcate
the line between the personal and the subpersonal. Absent such an
alternative theory, my defense of consciousness is like Churchill's
for democracy: not perfectly satisfactory, perhaps, but better than
any other that has been suggested. What else marks the boundary
between our selves and those somatic processes that we never
control directly, if it is not consciousness?
Morse voices a fourth rejoinder to my self-boundaries argument
and along the way has some fun using one of my well-known
thought experiments against me. Morse performs a "Moorean
thought experiment about what emotional reactions a properly
moral agent would and should have if, like Mrs. Cogdon, while
sleepwalking, she ever so effectively axe-bludgeoned her daughter
to death." 27 1 Supposing that a properly constituted Mrs. Cogdon
would and should feel guilty, Morse infers that therefore she would
be guilty of something. He further infers that the something she
would be guilty of is something she did, namely, kill her daughter
while she was asleep.
Mrs. Cogdon does have something to feel guilty about, but it is
not a supposed action she did while asleep. She should feel guilty
for being the kind of person who so hates her daughter, or is so
jealous of her, that she wishes her dead. We each have a responsisupra note 1, at 259.
257.
275 Morse, supra note 18, at 1644.
276 Id.
277Id. at 1647.
278 Id. at 1646.
273 MOORE,

274Id. at
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bility for our character, 279 and Mrs. Cogdon has some lousy
aspects to hers about which she should feel guilty. Yet our
responsibility for character is not to be confused with the kind of
responsibility the criminal law cares about, which is responsibility
for our actions.28' Guilt and felt guilt for bad character is thus
quite compatible with Mrs. Cogdon not having performed an action
when she axed her daughter to death.
It is also true that Mrs. Cogdon may feel guilt beyond that guilt
she feels for that part of her character comprised of her jealous
emotions and wishes. Something with which she was intimately
related, namely, her own body, was causally responsible for the
death of her daughter. She could feel bad about that. But then,
many of us feel bad when things less intimately connected to us
than our own bodies are the instrumentalities of others' misfortunes. When our children or our dogs hurt others, we often feel
badly too, even when there was no active supervision of them on
our part.
My second reason for betting that somnambulistic behaviors are
not actions is that the lack of consciousness while asleep prevents
the resolution of conflicting desires and intentions, and this
resolving function is one of the crucial functions distinctive of
volitions. 2 1 Perhaps because Morse finds this second reason to
be "even more promising," 28 2 he assembles a phalanx of arguments to defeat it. First, Morse argues, resolution of conflict cannot
be essential to the existence of volitions. This, for two reasons: (a)
Even when there is conflict (as in cases of extreme emotional
disturbance) and even when there is no resolution of that conflict
because the agent's emotions seal off his restraining desires, still
there is volitional action, 28 3 and (b) conflict of desires or of
intentions is not ubiquitous, 28 4 yet even where conflict is lacking
we often have volitions and actions. For both of these reasons, the
conflict-resolving function cannot be essential to volitions. Second,
Morse argues that I have not specified how many such desires must
2 9

* See Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,and Excuse, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 29,
40-41 (1990) (distinguishing responsibility for character from responsibility for action
and arguing that morally we have both kinds but that legally we both do and should
only the latter kind of responsibility).
recognize
2 80
See id. at 46-47.
211 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 258.
212 Morse, supra note 18, at 1647.
283 See id. at 1649-50.
284

See id. at 1648.
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be sealed off before the conflict-resolving function should be said
to be absent. 28 5 Third, he states that the unavailability of some
desires/intentions sounds like an excuse-a kind of ignorance or
286
lack of opportunity excuse-not negation of volition and action.
Fourth, there is some kind of conflict-resolving function going on
even in somnambulism because "the dissociated agent is not
'paralyzed' by conflict" 217 -he walks in his sleep, for example.
Such nonparalyzed responsiveness to an end at the very least, it is
argued, implies a resolution of conflict about the various means that
might be used to satisfy that end.288 Moreover, such nonparalyzed
responsiveness does resolve the conflict of ends because "the
countervailing considerations are not obliterated, but simply out of
concurrent awareness."

289

Morse's degree-vagueness point (the second above) is only
moderately worrisome. Some substantialamount of one's desires and
intentions must be accessible to an actor before he can be said to
resolve the conflict between them with a volition, and when we are
asleep only a few are.29 Morse's third point (about how this looks
like an excuse) is also not worrisome. Lack of volition in general
does look like an excuse, 291 so its excuse-like appearance here
should come as no surprise.
Morse's first and fourth points are more troublesome. They
reveal that much more needs to be said to render plausible my
With regard to the
conflict-resolving function for volitions.
ubiquitousness of conflict, I do think, unlike Morse, that conflict in
our desires is always present because to satisfy any one desire is
always at the cost of not at that time satisfying some other desire.
As I put it in Act and Crime: "Unless I am an obsessional neurotic
about keeping my hair trimmed (to a degree never observed even
in mental wards), I desire not only a haircut; I desire many other
things as well, the attainment of which can conflict with my getting
285 See

id.

286 See id.
287 Id.
288 See id.
289

Id.

29'Morse puns my requirement that a "fair sample" of such desires be accessible
before the conflict-resolving function can be said to be performed, taking "fair" to be
normative (and thus fitting of his "normative" theory of coercion). See id. at 1648.
My use of the word "fair" was not normative, but referred only to a substantial
sampling, as in "fair-to-middlin.'"
291 See Moore, supra note 202, at 1107-08.
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a haircut on any given occasion."2 92 Our desires are, for this
reason, always prima facie desires only, which is why we need those
"all-out" propositional attitudes of volition and intention.
With regard to the impassioned killer who acts despite not being
able to access his restraining desires, I doubt that either Morse or
I believe that such individuals lack access to a fair sample of their
desires and intentions as they decide what to do.2 9 For me, this
doubt springs from my sense that those "carried away by their own
emotions" typically allow themselves the luxury of "letting go." A
bad temper for such people is like a well-known negotiating
technique whereby one refuses to consider various things that
should reasonably restrain one. Sleepwalkers and other dissociated
individuals, however, do not have that control over the accessibility
of the full range of their desires and intentions. They are thus more
likely candidates for persons who lack the resolving functions served
by volitions and intentions than are those who are "overcome" by
emotion.
Morse's fourth point claims too much in the way of conflict
resolution for such dissociated persons. That they do not suffer a
paralysis of indecision is of course true, for their desires do issue in
their somnambulistic behaviors. Yet a paralysis of indecision is only
one way that conflicts of desires and intentions can fail to be
resolved. Another and more relevant way is for a desire or
intention not to have any input into a decision, for a desire or
intention so excluded is not resolved but "lives on." Morse's point
that there is at least a resolution of conflicting means by somnambulists, even if not of ends, does not help. The selection of means
always involves trade-offs against other ends that certain means will
frustrate, and it is precisely conflict with those other ends that is not
resolved by any "decisions" made while asleep. Morse's point that
conflict with these ends has been "resolved, albeit on 'thin'
grounds" (because such ends are "not obliterated"),2 94 is not true.
Ignoring certain desires or intentions is not the same as considering
them and either rejecting them or integrating them into one's
decision about what to do. The conflict-resolving function of
2

MOORE, supra note 1, at 139.

29 Such doubts are expressed by each of us. See Stephen Morse, Psychology,
Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT
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' Morse, supra note 18, at 1648.

1820

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1749

volition is not performed simply by behavioral output satisfying one
pole of desires in conflict.
Each of these points deserves greater consideration than I have
been able to give them here. I suspect that with such greater
consideration Morse and I would be able to truly resolve any
conflict that has remained, fusing our two sets of conflicting beliefs
into one coherent set. But that is because we are not dis-associated-that is, we communicate with each other regularly-allowing our
conflict-resolution function to operate smoothly.
VII. VOLITIONS AS THE ESSENTIAL BEGINNINGS OF ACTIONS
A. Volitions in Analyses of Action
A number of the commentators have doubts about volitions as
the unique instigators of actions. Some, such as Robert Audi,295
see clearly that I have two different needs for volitions in Act and
Crime: (1) to give an analysis of what actions are partly in terms of
volitions; and (2) to complete the rational explanation of the
changes we effect in the world by our actions. For the first need, I
use volitions to demonstrate the nature of the natural kind, human
action; this theory about action's essential nature is as close as I
come to analyzing (or defining) the concept of human action. For
the second need, I use volitions to complete the causal chain that
begins with belief/desire sets, proceeds through more general
intentions, and then proceeds through those less general intentions
I call volitions to the bodily movements and their effects in the
world. Volitions for the second need are part of my explanation of
human behavior, a role independent of any they play in analyzing
action.
Separating these two needs for volitions in my theory is
important because some worries about my volitional theory go only
to my use of volitions in the analysis of action, not to my use of
them in explaining behavior. Jennifer Hornsby, for example,
concludes that "volitions must ... be viewed as figments, filling an
imagined lacuna. " 211 She finds volitions unnecessary, however,
only because she sees my introduction of volitions as a substitute for
another definition of action (namely, her own in terms of the things

2" See Robert Audi, Volition, Intention, and Responsibility, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1675,
1685-87 (1994).
' Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1732.
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297
people do intentionally) that makes no mention of volitions.
Such satisfaction with alternative ways of defining the kind, action,
do not of course touch upon the question of whether volitions have
explanatory roles.
My main concern here is with the explanatory role of volitions,
since that was the concern of most of the commentators. Still, it is
worth pausing long enough to say why Hornsby's kind of definition
does not obviate the need for volitions even if we restrict ourselves
to an analysis of action. Hornsby's definition of action is: "an
action is a person's doing something intentionally," or, as she
alternatively rephrases it, "an action is a person's doing something
in attempting to do something."2 98 These definitions are harmless
enough, but they do not tell us very much. They are part and parcel
of the older, ordinary language style philosophy that produced
"conceptual analyses" like, an action is intentional when "a certain
299
sense of the question, 'Why?' is given application."

This playing around between near synonyms does not tell us
much, which is why it is relatively harmless. One of the harms that
it cannot do is to rule out theories about the nature of the kind of
thing to which words like "action" refer. While ordinary language
philosophy has historically enjoyed a curious kind of satisfaction
with analyses like Anscombe's and Hornsby's, science has demanded
more. We need to know what sort of things actions are, not just
how native English speakers use "action," "intentionally," "attempt,"
"try," and "why." Volitions may not be the right answer, but no
amount of discovery of near synonyms for "action" can show that
the question to which volitions purport to be the answer is a
question that need not be asked.

B. Volitions in Explanationsof Behavior
Most of what Bratman, Audi, Corrado, and Hornsby have to say
about volitions goes to their explanatory role, so I shall devote the
rest of my discussion to that. As Bratman notices, 3°° my argument
for volitions was in two steps. First, I argued for the distinctiveness
of intention from both wants and beliefs; 301 second, I argued for

2 See id. at 1731-32.
'Jennifer

Hornsby, On What's Intentionally Done, in ACTION AND VALUE IN

CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 40, at 55, 60; see also Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1727.
m ANSCOMBE, supra note 40, at 9.
3o See Bratman, supra note 40, at 1706.
sol See MOORE, supra note 1, at 137-49.
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the view that general intentions were not enough to explain actions
but that much more concrete intentions-"volitions"-were also needed.112 All of the commentators zeroed in on the second of these
steps, either leaving the first for another occasion or explicitly
agreeing with it."'3
1. Audi's Alternative Action Elicitors
Of the rich array of considerations offered here, let me pick but
a few for comment. Consider first Robert Audi's suggestion that
volitions may not be explanatorily necessary."0 4 Audi acknowledges that there must be some kind of "action-elicitors" that are caused
by more general intentions and which in turn cause bodily movements,. Sometimes it is plausible, he thinks, that these actionelicitors are events matching my description of volitions, but
generally Audi would substitute nonvolitional items as the more
likely candidates for the job of getting us moving: either perceptions, thoughts, decisions, a change in the balance of motivational
forces, the overcoming of inertia, or the striking-as-desirable-for-itsown-sake the doing of some action.3 0 5 This seemingly more
heterogeneous list of action-initiators is part of what Audi terms his
"guidance and control model" for explaining behavior.0 6 This
model is said have two differences with my "executive thrust model"
of volitions: (1) Audi's model posits a release of energy, as from a
compressed spring, whereas mine has the volition communicate its
energy, as in the firing of a bullet;.. 7 and (2) Audi's eliciting
events need have no Intentional content "given that the relevant
intentions and other attitudes already have content sufficient to
3 08
direct the action."
Audi's general temptation is a very old one. It is the same
temptation as gave rise to William James's ideomotor theory of
302 Id.

at 149-55.

sos See Bratman, supra note 40, at 1706. I am currently uncertain as to Audi's

views on this. In writing Act and Crime, I assumed Audi was a reductionist about
intention, reducing it to a combination of beliefs and desires. See ROBERT AUDI,
Intending, in ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 56 (1993). Now, however, in both his
present contribution and in chapter 3 of Action, Intention, and Reason, Audi seems
more sympathetic to the distinctiveness of intention.
"4 See Audi, supra note 295, at 1690-93.
1o See id.
"6 Id. at 1696-701.
307 See id. at 1698.
"8
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action, according to which action-initiators are "images" of actions.3 0 9 The temptation stems from a perceived greater respectability within psychology for cognitive than for conative mental
states. The temptation is thus to replace thrusting things with
seeing and releasing things. The temptation is succumbed to by
some physiologists as well, who can imagine volitions as vetoers of
31 0
actions even if they cannot imagine them as initiators of actions.
Yet the temptation is one to be resisted. As Myles Brand has noted,
"it is a deep insight of folk psychology that action is initiated only
by events with non-cognitive, motivational features."3 1'
Our
phenomenology, at least since Plato, has suggested to us that the
states that move us to action are quite different than the states that
represent the world to us as we wish or believe it to be. While our
phenomenology could certainly be wrong about this, we have every
reason to place our bets with it until science shows us that we
should not.
Leaving Audi's general model for his more particular list of six
substitutes for volitions, I find the list problematic first because of
its very heterogeneity. As Audi himself has recently noticed:
"[O]ne powerful reason to adopt a volitional theory [is that] it
supplies a causal factor which genetically unifies actions in terms of
a common kind of origin, even if not necessarily its ultimate origin,
in the psychology of the agent.""'2 Audi's six different factors do
not have this virtue, as he would no doubt acknowledge.
Audi's list also seems to take at face value the idiomatic things
people often say when referring to action-elicitors. He is here
unwilling to regiment these seemingly diverse sayings by a common
referent. If we were to so respect idiomatic usage about the
practical syllogism, it would, I suspect, usually be said to have only
one premise. For rarely do we explain why we went downtown by
saying both, "because I desired to buy some groceries and because
I believed that, if I went downtown, I would buy some groceries."
More idiomatic is: "because I wanted some groceries" or "because
I believed that groceries were easily available there."
More
idiomatic still would be to report facts, not desires or beliefs, as in:
"because a new grocery store opened up down there." The diversity

$09
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of items cited as reasons in idiomatic, everyday discourse should not
discourage us from unifying our motivational analysis in terms of
our standard, two-premised practical syllogism. The same is true for
what we casually say about immediate action elicitors.
2. Bratman's Rationality Constraints on
What Can Be an Intention
Bratman's disagreement with me is a narrow one. He and I
agree on what he accurately labels as the "distinctiveness of
intention" from desire and beliefs. We also agree that some actioninitiators are necessary if the execution of our more general
intentions into the appropriate bodily movements that execute them
is not just magical. I think we also agree that these action-initiators
are mental states-what Bratman calls "executive representations, "313 or elsewhere "endeavorings" 3 14 -and not merely subpersonal routines of our central nervous system. Where we disagree
is on whether these action-initiators are a species of intention or
not.
Bratman recognizes that I might argue for characterizing
volitions as intentions on what he calls the "simple view" that to
intentionally do A is to intend to do A. 3 15 Such an argument
would go like this: Any bit of behavior, to be an action at all, must
be intentional under some basic description like "moving one's
fingers"; yet if I intentionally moved my fingers, then (on the simple
view) I intended to move my fingers; since such intent has the same
object and function as what I call "volitions," we have every reason
to identify such intent with volitions. Bratman then seeks to
undercut the simple view and thus, this easy route to justifying my
categorization of volitions as intentions.
Yet I do not rely on the simple view to argue that volitions are
a species of intention. For one thing, if one has decided, as
Bratman and the criminal law have, to call actions done knowingly
as having been done intentionally, then one certainly does not want
the simple view. I may know that my act of freeing some prisoners
will have the side consequence of killing some guards, but I do not
intend to kill the guards. (However, in such cases we may not be
prepared to say we killed the guards, either intentionally or
515 Bratman,

supra note 40, at 1717.

s1 BRATMAN, supra note 40, at 130.

s15 See Bratman, supra note 40, at 1713.
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unintentionally, in which event this argument against the simple
view will not work.) 16
Bratman's real complaint against the simple view lies elsewhere.
Bratman rejects the simple view mainly because it would require
abandonment of one or both of two constraints on the rationality
of intentions that Bratman finds his planning theory of intentions
cannot do without. The first is that intentions must be consistent
with beliefs: I cannot rationally intend A while believing A is
impossible. The second is that intentions "agglomerate": If I
intend A, and if I intend B, then (if rational) I intend (A and B).
My own view of these rationality restraints on intention is that
their plausibility varies with the level of generality of the intentions
under view. Since Audi sees the same point, let me use his words.
With regard to intention/belief consistency: "What Moore could
say, then, is that while long-range,future-directed intentions, the kind
most important in planning, must meet the relevant belief condition, bare intentions,the kind plausibly identified with volition, need
not.""'7 And with regard to intention agglomerativity:
[C]onjunction [of intention] is to be expected above all when there is
some occasion to get the two objects of the propositional attitude in
question before the mind at once, and this is less likely with a momentary state than with a long-term one, such as an intention to pay a bill,
or to educate one's children 18
The point is that it is the planning function of intention that drives
Bratman to his two restrictions, yet these restrictions are less and
less necessary to successful planning as intentions become more and
more specific. There is no reason anywhere up or down this scale
to deny the honorific, "intention," to those states that together
execute belief/desire sets.
To some extent Bratman already must recognize this possibility
of successful planning despite failures of agglomerativity and of
intention/belief consistency at some level, for he concedes that
executive representations, or what I call volitions, do execute more
general intentions into the bodily movement programs that satisfy
them. He also concedes that agglomerativity and intention/belief
"I The argument against the simple view from side effects would not work
because, if we would not say about such side effects, "x caused them intentionally"
then the plain fact thatx does not intend to cause side effects presents no counterexamples to the simple view.
s'18 Audi, supra note 295, at 1681.
3

Id. at 1683.
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consistency do not hold for these executory states. So planning
obviously succeeds despite the failures of these least general
executory states to conform to his two rationality constraints. All
he need recognize now is that some degree of these failures could
also be true of more general intentions, even if to a lesser degree as
the intentions become more general (and thus, more central to
planning).
3. Corrado on the Superfluity of Requiring
Volitions for Liability
Corrado thinks that framing the voluntary act requirement of
the criminal law in terms of volitions adds nothing to what is
already required by the criminal law mens rea requirements. As he
puts it, "[t]he requirement that there be a willing or volition ... is
3 19
entailed by mens rea."
I am unsure what Corrado wishes to argue here. Does he want
to say that the voluntary act and mens rea requirements are one and
the same requirement? Or does he want to say that the requirement
that there be a voluntary act is superfluous because all crimes
require mens rea, and if the mens rea requirement is satisfied then
the voluntary act requirement must be satisfied too? And under
either of these readings, is it my volitional interpretation of the
voluntary act requirement that causes it to be identical or redundant
to the mens rea requirement, or are the two requirements so related
even under alternative interpretations of the voluntary act requirement? The answer to this latter question will determine whether
Corrado is criticizing my volitional account, or whether his
observations are about criminal law doctrine more generally. I am
more interested in the argument if it is directed against my
volitional interpretation of the voluntary act requirement, so I shall
so construe it.
I find very curious what Corrado means by "the mens rea requirement." He apparently thinks that crimes of general intent, specific
intent, recklessness, negligence, and strict liability all have a
common mens rea requirement: "[T]he act must be intentional
319 Corrado, supra note 44, at 1544 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Elsewhere Corrado says that the requirement that there be a volition "is not
independent," but follows from mens rea. Id. at 1533. He also says that "there is no

separate requirement of a volitional act," because it "duplicates" the condition already

secured by mens rea, and that "there is no independent volition requirement." Id.
at 1546.
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under some description, or there cannot be a conviction. I take the
need for that to be a mens rea requirement."3 2 Thus all crimes,
in this sense, are crimes having as their mens rea the requirement
of intention.
Corrado is insistent that his identity/redundancy point hinges
on this sense of the mens rea requirement. But if this is what
Corrado means by mens rea, it is very easy to show an identity
between his "mens rea requirement" and the voluntary act requirement under any interpretation of the latter. For Corrado's
supposed mens rea requirement is just another way of stating the
voluntary act requirement. Intentionality in Corrado's sense is a
criterion for action itself, as Donald Davidson 32 ' and, more
recently, Jennifer Hornsby322 have shown. As Davidson used to
put it, an agent will have acted "if and only if there is a description
of what he did that makes true a sentence that says he did it
23
intentionally."
The voluntary act requirement is, of course, duplicative of the
mens rea requirement when the latter is construed to be no more
than the requirement that an action have been performed. However, mens rea does not mean "that an action have been performed."
Like Humpty Dumpty, Corrado can of course mean what he pleases
by "mens rea," but he cannot make the phrase mean what he
pleases. The phrase means something quite different than what he
means by it. "Mens rea" means some mental state of intention or
belief having as its object a particular description of an action (not
any description), or that substitute for true mental states we call
negligence.
Consider the mens rea requirements of intention or belief,
where presumably Corrado's point is strongest. Imagine three
criminal prohibitions: assault with intent to kill, knowing importation of a controlled substance into the United States, and reckless
(or "depraved heart") murder. The voluntary act requirement
requires that the accused intends that his body move at all; the
mens rea requirements would be, respectively, that the accused:
intends his movements to cause death, believes that the goods he is
transporting are controlled substance and that his movements will
cause them to cross the border into the United States, or believes
3

20

Id. at 1545.

supra note 55, at 46-50.
See Hornsby, supra note 298, at 55-60.
323 DAVIDSON, supra note 55, at 46.
321 See DAVIDSON,
'2
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that his movements substantially risk death. Such intentions or
beliefs required to satisfy the mens rea requirements of such
statutes do not have at all the same objects as do the intentions (or
volitions) to cause bodily movements (which is what the voluntary
act requirement requires on my interpretation).
Since all of this was gone into in some detail in Act and
Crime,3 24 I am loath to interpret Corrado only to be making the
point he seems to say he is making. Perhaps he should be interpreted to be saying that mens rea means the requirements of intention,
belief and negligence just illustrated, but that if this (admittedly
distinct) requirement is satisfied so too must be the voluntary act
requirement. Yet this latter point does not address my volitional
interpretation of the voluntary act requirement specifically; it
purports to apply to that requirement generically, however
interpreted. Moreover, this point is obviously false, insofar as it
applies to crimes of negligence and strict liability (where there is no
mens rea requirement of intent or belief). The only way that
Corrado can hide the obvious falsity of this second interpretation
of his thesis is by going back to the first interpretation, where he
pretends that the mens rea requirement for crimes of negligence
and strict liability require that the act be intentional under some
description. Yet again: It is not the mens rea requirement of
negligence or strict liability that requires this, it is the voluntary act
requirement.
Even with respect to crimes requiring intent or belief for their
mens rea, the second interpretation of Corrado's thesis is false. As
I argued in my discussion with Morse, it may sometimes be true that
somnambulists have desires and general intentions and their sleepbehavior is responsive to those mental states. Thus, some somnambulists may satisfy a mens rea requirement of intent or belief, yet
what such somnambulists lack is what the act requirement requires:
those volitions that execute their desires and intentions into actions.

4. Some Objections Not Here Reconsidered
These four objections of Hornsby, Audi, Bratman, and Corrado
to volitions do not exhaust all the worries they have raised about

S24See MOORE, supra note 1, at 172-73.
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such items in this Article. Audi, for example, also worries whether
volitions are as relevant to responsibility as I claim, proposing longterm intentions and wants as more relevant to responsibility because
more constitutive of who we are.125 Hornsby also voices her
doubts that the subpersonal science will turn out in a way that
verifies the existence of volitions1 2' Both Hornsby and Audi voice
what Audi calls the "phenomenological objection" to volitions,
namely, there do not seem to be enough of them around in our
experience to do the work I demand of them.32
And Corrado
raises his Chisholm-inspired incompatibilism to raise doubts about
the need for a volitional account when a requirement that the
choice be free would do the trick.121 I have said pretty much what
I had to say to each of these points in Act and Crime.3 29 In any
case, I do not wish to abuse the invitation of the editors, which is no
doubt quickly approaching its limits.
VIII. GOLDMAN, TROPES, AND FINE-GRAINED
ACTION INDIVIDUATION

Alvin Goldman was the only one of my commentators to tackle
the difficult problem of action-individuation, both as a metaphysical
330
matter and with regard to the law's need to deal with this issue.
Like me, Goldman finds the metaphysics of action to be of
relevance to legal issues. More specifically, we both think that the
metaphysics of action individuation has some bearing on the
criminal law doctrines dealing with the spatiotemporal locations of
criminal acts and on those doctrines dealing with double jeopardy.
Since Goldman's metaphysics differs considerably from mine, his

" See Audi, supra note 295, at 1703.

326 See
27
- See

Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1735 n.53.
Audi, supra note 295, at 1684-86; Hornsby, supra note 19, at 1734-35.
S28 See Corrado, supra note 44, at 1554.
" Namely:

(1) that long-term intentions are no doubt more relevant to

responsibility for one's character,but character-responsibility is not the relevant kind
of responsibility for punishment, see MOORE, supra note 1, at 52-54; (2) that it is an
open question how the science of the subpersonal will turn out, although I am
probably more optimistic about that science matching the concepts of the folk
psychology than is Hornsby, see id. at 130-33, 163-65; (3) that the phenomenological
evidence for volitions is better than Audi and Hornsby allow if one takes preconscious
mental states and mental states needed to learn routines into account, see id. at 15055; and (4) incompatibilist metaphysics cannot replace anything because it is false, see
id. at 73-77. See also Moore, supra note 202.
- See Goldman, supra note 36.
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clear and succinct paper provides an instructive contrast to the
approach taken in Act and Crime.
Goldman's is a single-instance trope metaphysics for all events,
human actions included. Tropes are instances of properties.3 1
Of some white dog, we should distinguish: (1) the object-particular,
the dog, which exemplifies whiteness; from (2) the abstract universal,
whiteness, which all white things share; from (3) the abstract
particular or property-instance, or "trope," which is the particular
instance of whiteness that this dog possesses. An event-type such as
killing is for Goldman an abstract universal, whereas an event-token
such as Jones's act of killing Smith yesterday is an instance of the
universal, killing. The "fineness of grain" of Goldman's metaphysics
comes from his insistence that an event is only a single property3 2
instance, not a constellation of such instances.1
Thus, what my
"coarse-grained" metaphysics would identify as one event, his would
identify as being as many events as there are properties instantiated.
The act-token, Jones killing of Smith yesterday, is different than the
act-token, Jones moving his finger on the trigger, Jones firing the
gun, Jones shooting Smith-even thoughJones killed Smith by (what
I would call) one single act having all of these properties.
In Act and Crime I recognized that I could not hope to deal
adequately with all the arguments, pro and con, raised by the
literature on the fine-grained versus the coarse-grained versus the
moderately fine-grained views.33 3 Goldman helpfully remedies this
deficiency (at least as seen from his side of the street). I shall again
eschew dealing with the full range of arguments -that Goldman
addresses. In particular, I shall not respond to the "by-relation" or
the "adverbial modifiers" arguments. This, not because these are
not important arguments, but because they are sufficiently complicated issues that a great deal needs to be said, not all of which I at
present know that I want to say. So I shall restrict myself to the
issues Goldman raises in response to arguments of mine in Act and
Crime. These are fruitfully grouped into three sets of issues,
separately discussed below.

...
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 68-69.
PARTICULARS (1990).
32

See generally KEITH

CAMPBELL, ABSTRACT

On single-instanced versus multiple instanced trope accounts of events, see

MOORE, supra note 1, at 369-70; Goldman, supra note 36, at 1569.
...
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 297.
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A. The Problem of Causes and Effects
Like most arguments on this issue, the arguments Goldman
advances from causal relations involving events appeal to the
Indiscernability of Identicals Principle, which states that identicals
share all the same properties."" Goldman and I both explicitly
assume that the Indiscernability Principle cannot be questioned for
extensional contexts and that statements of causal relations are
extensional.33 5 Thus, the problem Goldman puts to me: An act
that on my coarse view is but one act-token nonetheless seems to
have different causal properties, depending on how it is described.
Two of Goldman's examples:
(a) Ned's playing the piano both puts Dolly to sleep and wakes
Molly up. These being but three different ways of referring to
a single act-token on my view, then if it is true that Ned's
playing the piano caused Molly to wake up, then it must also
be true that Ned's putting Dolly to sleep caused Molly to wake
up. Yet, Goldman concludes, Ned's putting Dolly to sleep did
not cause Molly's awakening, and therefore these are not
merely different descriptions of one and the same act-token;
since they have different effects, they must be different act33 6
tokens.
(b) Dretske's car moving down the highway has a number of
different aspects: it is moving, it is moving at 63 mph, and it
is moving in a certain direction. All just one event on my
coarse view. Yet what aspect of this event we use to describe
it makes a difference as to the truth of what caused it:
Dretske's "heavy foot is responsible for the speed, the dirty
carburetor for the intermittent pauses, and the potholes in the
road for the teeth-jarring vertical component of the movement. " 3s
Goldman thus concludes that these cannot be
descriptions of one event, but must refer to separate events,
for each has a different cause.
My general response in Act and Crime to this problem was to say
that the events in such examples do have the same effects and
causes, no matter how such events are described; but that some
descriptions will sound odd because of redundancy: to say that
Jones's killing of Smith caused Smith's death is pragmatically odd

a See id. at 283 n.9.
a See id.; Goldman, supra note 36, at 1573 n.23.
See Goldman, supra note 36, at 1564-65.

See id. at 1567 (quoting FRED

DRETSKE, EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR

30 (1988)).
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because we already know that Smith's death occurred by the way the
act of Jones is described in the subject of the sentence (as a killing
of Smith). To repeat in the predicate information already contained
in the subject of a sentence always sounds odd. 3 8
Goldman accurately points out that this explanation does not
work for his piano example or for many other examples. So
Goldman issues me a challenge: "[N]o appeal to repetition can
explain the oddity in question. Of course, Moore may not restrict
pragmatic oddity to repetition, but he does not identify any other
" ss9
source of pragmatic oddity that would cover the present case.
Supplying such a source will be my present task.
Causal talk like saying, "Ned's playing the piano caused Molly to
wake up" or "Dretske's heavy foot caused his car to move at 63
mph," is fraught with ambiguity. When we use "cause," we may
mean to describe singular causal relations between event-tokens or
we may mean to describe causal generalizations relating eventtypes. 3 40 Since on my coarse-grained view we individuate types
very differently than tokens, things will sound very odd if we mean
token but are taken to mean type.
Take Dretske's car moving down the highway. There is only one
event-token here, on my view. Therefore, anything that causes that
event-token under one description of the latter also causes it (that
same event-token) under any other. Dretske's heavy foot, his dirty
carburetor, and the potholes all cause one event-token, the
movement of his car at that time. What makes it sound odd to say
things like, "Dretske's lead-footing the accelerator caused the teethjarring motion," is the way we pick out the motion event. By
picking it out with the description, "teeth-jarring motion," we may
easily be taken not to be referring to the event-token of movement;
rather, we may seem to be (and in fact, usually are) referring to
properties of one event-token as we explain with a causal generalization another property of another event-token. And it is just false that
the type of event constituted by the property, depressed accelerator,
causally explains the type of event constituted by the property, teethjarring vertical moving. There is no true generalization connecting
these two types of events.
This explanation also fits Goldman's first kind of example.
Ned's putting Dolly to sleep does cause Molly to wake up. We can
ass See MOORE, supra note 1, at 289 n.19.
339 Goldman, supra note 36, at 1565-66.

" See, e.g., Audi, supra note 295, at 1694.
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remove any oddity by disambiguating the expression to make clear
we are referring to act-tokens and the singular causal relations
between them, not act-types and the causal generalizations that hold
between them. "The act which caused Dolly to go to sleep also
caused Molly to wake up," does not sound odd at all because we
have made clear that we are talking about an act-token doing some
singular causing. The original way of putting it does not get rid of
this ambiguity, so we could be taken to mean: "It was a property of
Ned's act, namely, that it put Dolly to sleep, that causally explains
another property of Ned's act, namely, that it woke Molly up." And
this would be a peculiar thing to say since, on Goldman's stipulated
facts, it is obviously false.
My account here of course relies on there being a distinction
between statements describing singular causal relations between
event-tokens and statements giving causal explanations in terms of
true generalizations holding between event-types. Part of what
determines whether such a distinction is viable is what one takes
singular causal relations to be, if they exist at all. The analysis given
in Act and Crime rejects the counterfactual interpretation of
causation. 34 1 One reason to do so is precisely because such an
analysis, which is very popular, elides the distinction between
singular causal relations and causal generalizations. Counterfactuals
are usually taken to deal with types of events, here asking, if an
event of one type did not occur, would an event of some other type
also not have occurred? 34 2 Such an analysis of causation does not
allow me my distinction, which is (another) good reason to reject it.
If we recognize the distinction and the latent ambiguity it
infuses into many causal statements, then we have a ready explanation for Goldman's apparent counterexamples. Make clear that
what is wanted in such examples are explanations34 3 (and thus,
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 268-75.
If counterfactuals are not taken to be about types, but were taken to be about
tokens, then they would not be extensional. See Michael Moore, ForeseeingHarm
Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 40, at 143, 143-45;
DAVIDSON, supra note 55, at 157.
m Dretske is plain that it is explanation that interests him:
[W]hen the business at hand is explanation ... there may be a variety of
different things to explain about any given piece of behavior. Breathing is
one thing; breathing deeply, in a person's ear, and when the person asked
you to stop, are all different things and may, accordingly, all have different
explanations.
DRETSKE, supra note 337, at 30. As long as we take "things to explain" to be aspects
or properties of act-tokens (or Hornsby's "things done"), and not separate act-tokens,
34
3

1834 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1749
generalizations about types), and we coarse folks would not say all
the odd things Goldman attributes to us because they are obviously
false. But make clear that what is wanted in such examples is not
explanation but singular causal relations, then we coarse folks will
say all the odd things Goldman wants us to say, but they won't
sound odd any longer because everyone will be clear about what is
meant.
Goldman has partially anticipated my response here, insofar as
he foresees that "the coarse-grained approach can say that there is
but a single event which has many aspects or facets."3 1' Goldman
urges that this won't help because the coarse-grained approach will
still need some finely individuated "facet-instances" to both cause
and be caused by other "facet-instances," or tropes. The facets
themselves, which are abstract universals, will not do, "for properties themselves do not participate in causal relations." 45 Since we
thus need property-instances to stand in these causal relations, we
might as well call these finely individuated things "event-tokens."
What Goldman overlooks (or perhaps rejects) is the difference
between the causal generalizations used in giving causal explanations and statements of singular causal relations. Armed with that
distinction, we have no need of any finely individuated things to
stand in singular causal relations; rather, all we need are the
properties themselves and the types they constitute to make true
our causal generalizations. So armed, all we now need is to keep
clear what we are talking about when we talk about events, causes,
and effects: Are we talking about singular causal relations or causal
generalizations? Where we are clear, we will not sound odd. 46
B. The SpatiotemporalLocations of Actions
Goldman remarks that I "might be surprised to find a finegrained theorist willing to yield ground on the spatiotemporal
questions" of action location. 4 7 I am. Goldman is right that it
never occurred to me that tropists about events would take what he

Dretske is surely correct about the possibility of separate explanations for separate
"things."

Goldman, supra note 36, at 1572.
s Id. at 1573.
4 At least to other metaphysicians. I think Freeman thinks we all sound pretty
odd. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
47 Goldman, supra note 36, at 1583.
344
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calls the "short view" of when and where such events occur. 48
Being surprised in this way does not leave me feeling as though I
had gained some ground, however, as Goldman suggests. Rather,
I feel a bit like the French in 1939, who having built a very nice wall
of defenses then saw the Germans disdain any frontal assault in
favor of a flanking maneuver. It is only small comfort that Goldman
thinks it was a "reasonable" 49 wall to have built, given the deployment of enemy forces at the time it was built.
I am intrigued by Goldman's suggestion that a property instance
theory of events can adopt the short view of spatiotemporal location
for events. This means that Goldman thinks that when Jones kills
Smith by moving his (Jones's) finger at t1 , which causes an arrow to
hit Smith at t2, which causes Smith to die at t 3, the killing trope
occurs only at tj and not over the interval, t1 - t3, nor at t3 alone.
It is not clear how we locate tropes. Goldman suggests that "the
temporal span or duration of an act-token [property-instance on his
view] must be the period over which the agent exemplifies the acttype in question. " "' For killings, we thus should ask when does
the "agent exeinplify the act-type of killing." 51 Yet my sense is that
Jones becomes a killer of Smith only when Smith dies, for unless
Smith dies, Jones is no killer. Jones by his act at tj can become a
killer at t, if Smith dies then, but how can Jones be a killer at t1 with
no dead victim?
Another way to raise this query is by imagining thatJones moves
his fingers at tj which causes the striking of Smith with the arrow at
t 2 , but that Smith does not die. If everything is the same in this
revised scenario except for Smith's death at t3, do we want to say
that Jones exemplifies killing at tj but that it was a defeasible
exemplification in the sense that, when it becomes clear that Smith
will not die from the arrow, Jones will cease exemplifying the acttype of killing?
My own coarse-grained metaphysics of events allows me to adopt
the short view here without difficulty. Jones's act of killing is done
once he moves his fingers at t1. Jones becomes a killer, and his act
acquires the property of being a killing, only when Smith dies at
t3.352

Goldman cannot say this, because for Goldman there is no

S48Id.

at 1581.

39 Id.

s-o
Id. at 1582.
351

Id.

352 MOORE,

supra note 1, at

285-86.
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one act of Jones that can later acquire the property of being a
killing; the trope of being a killing is, on Goldman's fine-grained
metaphysics, the act, and such a trope of killing cannot itself later
acquire the property of being a killing.
Perhaps Goldman should retract his linkage between when an
exemplifying of killing takes place with when an instantiation of
killing takes place. Goldman, like most tropists, thinks that there is
a "subtle but important distinction... between exemplifying a
property and being an instance of, or case of, a property."3 5 3 Objects
like Jones exemplify properties like killing, whereas tropes are the
instances of the act-type, killing. Goldman could then say thatJones
exemplifies killing when he becomes a killer (which is at t3 when
Smith dies), but thatJones's act of killing (which is a trope) instantiates killing only at t,. This would give Goldman the short view of
actions, in other words, without having to say that actors are killers
before anyone dies.
The problem with this move is that if one divorces the locations
of property instances from the locations of objects exemplifying
those properties, I do not know how one could locate tropes at all.
Take the white dog of my earlier example. We cannot use whiteness
to give location to this instance of whiteness, because whiteness is
an abstract universal. If we give up the object exemplifying
whiteness, the dog, as our locator, how could we assign the
whiteness-instance possessed by the dog any location at all? If the
whiteness trope does not come into existence only when the dog
begins to exemplify the property of being white, I would not know
how to locate the trope temporally. The same quandary would
beset any attempt to divorce the temporal location of killing
instances from the exemplifying of killing done by people likeJones.
35 4
But again, Jones exemplifies killing only when Smith dies.

Goldman, supra note 36, at 1568.
s I have put aside Goldman's argument from a killing being a causing of death,
and a causing of death taking place when the actor does the moving that causes the
death. See id. at 1582-83. I do not think one gets much mileage out of "causing"
"'

here, any more than Corrado does in his worries about whether a "causing can be an
event" and whether causings can "cause other events". Corrado, supra note 44, at
1533 n.22. This, because of a triple ambiguity about "causing" in these contexts. In
"When did Jones causing Smith's death take place?," we could be using "causing" to
refer to: (1) the act-token ofJones, which on my theory is when he moved his body
at t,; (2) the ending of the causal process, that is, at death at t3; or (3) the entire
process during which the causing did its work, t, - tI. See MOORE, supra note 1, at
288. Given the nuanced meaning suggested by exactly how one phrases and
emphasizes the question (a feature Goldman also notices, see Goldman, supranote 36,
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C. No DoubleJeopardyfor the Same Tropes?
Goldman is fascinated as am I about the intersection of action
theory with the double jeopardy requirement of criminal law. He
seeks to suggest how his different metaphysics of actions yields a
more comprehensible legal requirement than my coarse-grained
view.
On my metaphysics of action there are two distinct questions
that must be asked and answered in any double jeopardy case: (1)
is the defendant who has performed one (coarse-grained) act-token
nonetheless guilty of several offenses (i.e., prohibited types of
actions); and (2) has the defendant who is guilty of but one offense
(again prohibited type of action) nonetheless guilty of having done
that offense more than once.355 In my schema, one must individuate types of actions (offenses) to answer the first question, and one
must individuate offense-tokens to answer the second question.
Goldman's fine-grained metaphysics may make it seem as if
there is only one question to ask here, which is: How many offensetokens did the accused do? Since an offense-token for Goldman is
an instance of the conjunctive property described by each criminal
statute, an accused who at t,, t2, and t. does some driving, and who
does so on each occasion while drunk, unlicensed, and in an
overweight vehicle, is guilty of nine offense-tokens (three instances
of three offenses).
Yet the unitary nature of the question asked by Goldman's
metaphysics is illusory. Notice that the individuation of tropes
depends partly on the individuation of the properties of which they
are instances: different property, different trope. Therefore
Goldman's trope individuation question has to ask and answer just
the question I raised in chapter 13 of Act and Crime, which is, how
do we individuate universals for double jeopardy purposes?
Goldman begins where I began in Act and Crime, thinking that each
distinct statute describes a distinct property3 56 (and thus, there will
be a distinct instance of each property for Goldman). Yet this won't
do, the most obvious reason being that this fine-grained an
individuation of properties would allow multiple prosecution and
punishment of lesser included offenses. 3 7 Goldman seeks to
at 1582-83) there is little meat for argument for anyone out of these usages.
See MOORE, supra note 1, at 318-24.
5
See id. at 328, 333-37; Goldman, supra note 36, at 1584-85.
3'7 See MOORE, supra note 1, at 335-36.
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accommodate this lesser-included-offense sense of "same offense"
with his notion of an act-tree."' 8 (An act-tree for Goldman is that
structured set of tropes that collectively is what we coarser types
think is one act-token.)
This response by Goldman will not work. Goldman's act-tree
notion answers a different question than the "same offense"
question asks, even when that latter question is restricted to lesser
included offenses. 59 When we ask in the abstract whether assault
with a deadly weapon is or is not a lesser-included offense of armed
robbery, we are asking a question having nothing to do with Jones's
or any one else's particular actions. We are asking a question of
property (or type) individuation: Are these types of offenses related
in a way that for double jeopardy purposes they should be treated
as one type? Whether a set of property-instances are all nodes on
one act-tree cannot help with this double jeopardy question; for the
structure of each act tree is a question wholly dependent on the
peculiarities of each particular (coarse-grained) act there is. An
instance of armed robbery by Jones at t, will be part of one sort of
act-tree, and an instance of armed robbery by Smith at t2 will be part
of another sort of act-tree. Nothing in either of these trees will help
us to decide the abstract question about the types, armed robbery
and assault with a deadly weapon.
So not only is there a disguised property individuation question
contained within Goldman's approach to double jeopardy, his
metaphysics gives him no better resources with which to answer it
than are available to his coarser colleagues.
We all have to
individuate properties as best we can, even if some of us are doing
so in order then to individuate tropes. My own approach to
property individuation for double jeopardy purposes is what I call
the individuation of morally salient act types.36 It is a mode of
individuation of properties no less available to Goldman's than to
my own metaphysics, so I commend it to him.
Goldman's fine-grained metaphysics also does not obviate the
need for asking my second sort of double jeopardy question.
Indeed, Goldman's metaphysics and mine ask exactly the same sort
of second question here: Once we have individuated the relevant
properties (offense types), how many instances of them did the
See Goldman, supra note 36, at 1584-86.
s Offense types that are the same for double jeopardy purposes are not limited
"s

to lesser included offenses. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 346-49.
mo See id. at 337-55.
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defendant do? Moreover, Goldman's metaphysics give him no more
resources than mine give me. This, for two reasons. First, because
the "unit of offense" question here is exactly the same for both
Goldman and me. Over a fourteen day drive, how many instances
of "joy-riding" did the defendant do? Goldman's act-trees, and the
tropes they are composed of, here can do no work for him, for what
he needs is a principle of individuating whole act-trees, one from
the other. How many acts of driving were begun by these basic
acts? 61 How many tropes are within the tree of each of these basic
acts, or whether we identify all such tropes with their generating
basic act, are idle questions here, in the sense that the answers just
do not matter to the individuation question asked.
It is easy to parody the difficulties of the trope theorist here. As
one such theorist admits, "continuous, gradual change gives anyone
trying to count tropes a headache, but what is perhaps worse, plain
stolid uniform unchangingness yields problems too."362
The
parody would be unfair because the tropist is here no worse off than
is the coarse-grained colleague. Their metaphysical difference make
no difference here, for both must divide continuous swatches of
behavior like driving into one, several, or many instances.
The second reason Goldman's metaphysics give him no leg up
here is because the best interpretation of double jeopardy requires
a principle of instance-individuation that is not purely metaphysical.
As I argue in chapter 14 of Act and Crime, the principle wanted here
is not one counting act-tokens as such, be they tropes or coarse acttokens; wanted is a count of instances of distinct moral wrongs,
because only this count determines desert and proportionate
punishment. (I call this "wrong-relative act-token individuation.")
And while an extremely fine-grained tropist might have some
metaphysical differences with me even while sharing this approach,
as I understand Goldman's current metaphysics I see no difference.
If unconsented-to kissing is wrong, andJohn causes just one contact
between his lips and Mary, both Goldman and I count there to be
just one instance of such wrong despite different descriptions of

" In Goldman's older terminology, the relevant individuation question here is
one about compound actions, and being fine-grained or coarse-grained about complex
actions is idle here. See ALVIN GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION 28, 34-37

(1970) ("[T]here is no minimal (or maximal) temporal length for a unit of action ....

[Any] shortest unit... is quite arbitrary.

subdivided into their temporal parts .... ").
362 CAMPBELL, supra note 304, at 140.

Acts of this length could be
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that instance (such as, John kissing Mary, doing so tenderly, on the
check, furtively, etc.). 63
AFTERWORD
As anyone knows who has finished a book-length treatment on
any topic, usually the last thing the author wants to do is return
right away to that topic. Until I received the papers in this
Symposium I assumed that this would be true of me with respect to
the philosophy of action. Each of the papers was sufficiently
challenging and interesting, however, that this general truth was not
here true at all. These papers have rekindled my interest in the
philosophy of action and the criminal law, and I hope they have a
like impact on outside readers of this Symposium.
It has been a pleasure to respond to each of the comments by
this group of distinguished commentators. I hope that they have
enjoyed the exchange as much as have I. I owe each of them a debt
of gratitude for their willingness to go after some part of Act and
Crime with which they disagreed. I am aware of the compliment
contained even in the most critical of such efforts, and I thank each
of them for it.

-63

n.17.

Compare MOORE, supra note 1, at 370-72 with Goldman, supra note 36, at 1570

